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PRACTICED MORAL ACTIVISM 
PAUL R. TREMBLAY· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Readers of legal ethics literature frequently encounter the follow-
ing question: "Can a good lawyer be a good person?"! This Article ad-
dresses a variation of that question: "Can a good lawyer be a good 
person if that person is not a good philosopher?»2 This new question 
confronts a perplexing realization about most moral exploration of 
lawyering-that it takes place amidst a language and an intellectual 
world with which most practicing lawyers are not familiar or conver-
sant. Of course, the philosophers3 inhabiting that world and using that 
language aim to affect the lives of working attorneys in some concrete 
way, but reading the philosophers does not self-evidently show how 
their world connects to the world of practice. This article expresses that 
• Associate Clinical Professor, Boston College Law School. Several colleagues have been 
kind enough to read earlier drafts of this work, and I have benefited from their comments. I 
thank Mark Aaronson, Reed Loder, Peter Margulies, Avi Soifer, and Mark Spiegel for their 
reactions, and Johann Lee for his able research assistance. Finally, I thank Dean Avi Soifer 
and Boston College Law School for financial support. 
1. Originally in Charles Fried, Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lallyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976), and most recently in Daniel R. Coquillette, 
Professionalism: The Deep Theory, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1271, 1272 (1994), but most of the arti-
cles I discuss under the rubric of "morally activist lawyering" address that question, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly. That question serves as the unifYing theme for one of the most important 
collections of essays in this area. See DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES 
AND LAWYERS' Emcs 38-39 (1983) [hereinafter LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER]. Leslie Griffin 
refers to it as the "Rorschach test for contemporary legal ethics." Leslie Griffin, The Lav.yer·s 
Dirty Hands, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 219, 233 (1995). 
2. The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has addressed a comparable question about "plain 
persons" and moral philosophy. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: 
Rules. Virtues and Goods, LXVI AM. CATH. PHIL. Q. 3 (1992) (concluding that ordinary per-
sons and philosophers address inseparable questions). See also Alasdair MacIntyre, What Has 
Ethics to Learn from Medical Ethics?, 2 PHILOSOPHIC EXCHANGE 37, 40 (1978) [hereinafter 
MacIntyre, What Has Ethics to Learn] ("Medical men and women have as much chance of not 
being philosophers as M. Jourdain had of not speaking prose."). 
3. I term "philosophers" those scholars who rigorously explore or critique the moral di-
mension of law practice and legal institutions, applying in their exploration or critique the 
arguments and constructs of moral philosophy. Some of the scholars whom I fit into this cate-
gory are philosophers by profession, for example, David Luban, Gerald Postema, Virginia Held, 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Alan Goldman, and Susan Wolf; others are law professors who fit my 
definition of philosopher, such as William Simon, Stephen Ellmann, Stephen Pepper, Deborah 
Rhode, Gerald L6pez, Rob Atkinson, Thomas Shaffer and Robert Gordon. Still others may be 
both philosophers and lawyers. such as Richard Wasserstrom, Reed Loder, David Wasserman, 
M.B.E. Smith and Charles Fried. For my purposes here, they are all functionally philosophers. 
9 
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connection. 
The disjunction between the experts and theorists on the one hand 
and the practitioners on the other is a common observation of late.4 
Whether or not that complaint is sustainable generally, it has notable 
relevance to the recent intense inquiry about the moral justification of 
the lawyering role. The question of whether lawyers are morally justi-
fied in fulfilling their traditional roles has been a dominant focus of 
legal ethics over the past twenty years.5 Progressive writers have chal-
lenged that justification, suggesting a "morally activist"6 posture to 
contrast with the idea of "neutral partisanship,"7 often called the "stan-
dard conception" of the lawyer's role.s The progressives' moral activ-
ism demands accountability from lawyers for their actions. The stan-
dard conception, by contrast, relieves lawyers of any moral accountabil-
ity so long as lawyers do not violate the law for their clients. The 
4. Judge Harry Edwards has complained that most academic scholarship produced in re-
cent years is of little use to practicing lawyers or sitting judges. See Harry T. Edwards, The 
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 9 I MICH. L. REv. 34, 
35, 42-57 (1992). Whatever one thinks of Edwards' controversial critique, and it has been chal-
lenged on many fronts (see, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers. Scholars. and the "Middle 
Ground," 91 MICH. L. REv. 2075 (1993); Paul Brest, Plus <;a Change, 91 MICH. L. REv. 
1945 (1993», he is correct that much law faculty production has drifted away from doctrinal 
analysis and tended more toward philosophical and sociological study. That trend has not 
missed the professional responsibility field, but a substantial segment of scholarship within legal 
ethics remains either doctrinal (see, e.g., Fred Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. 
REv. 351 (1989); Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. 
J. LEGAL Enncs 823 (1992» or attending to questions of effective lawyer regulation (see, e.g., 
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 799 (1992); Susan P. 
Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389 (1992); Symposium, 
The Attorney-Client Relationship in a Regulated Society, 35 SO. TEX. L. REv. 571 (1994». 
5. See Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 835, 836 (1987) 
(describing Anglo-American legal ethics writers as preoccupied with "the issue of moral per-
missibility," and focusing their greatest attention on "the moral propriety of the adversary sys-
tem"). 
6. This term relies upon David Luban's label of "moral activism," see DAVID LUBAN, 
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETIIICAL STIJDY 60 (1988) [hereinafter LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUS-
TICE], and Naomi Cabn's phrase "moral lawyering," see Naomi R. Cabn, Inconsistent Stories, 
81 GEO. L.J. 2475, 2500-02 (1993) [hereinafter Cahn, Inconsistent Stories]. See also David 
Rosenthal, The Criminal Defonse Attorney. Ethics. and Maintaining Client Confidentiality: A 
Proposal to Amend Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Profossional Conduct, 6 ST. THOMAS L. 
REv. 153, 157 (1993) (referring to activists as "moralists"). 
7. This phrase is often attributed to William Simon. William H. Simon, Ideology of Ad-
vocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WISC. L. REV. 29, 36 [hereinafter 
Simon, Ideology of Advocacy] (discussing the principles of neutrality and partisanship). Da"id 
Luban and Deborah Rhode coined the phrase from Simon's work, although "without suggesting 
that it is the sole 'standard' view of legal ethics." DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, 
LEGAL ETIIICS 137 (1992). 
8. This phrase originated with Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional 
Ethics, 55 N.Y.V. L. REv. 63, 73 (1980). 
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philosophers line up on both sides of this debate. The resulting dia-
logue is engaging and lively, but at the same time it is often complex, 
intellectually nuanced, and deeply philosophical. Since the question at 
issue--that of moral justification of lawyer role-is fundamentally 
philosophical, we of course look to the experts for their guidance and 
wisdom. That wisdom and guidance, in return, will often, although not 
always,9 be prescriptive in nature, suggesting new or alternative ways 
for lawyers or legal institutions to behave. \0 
In their prescriptive role the philosophers encounter a difficulty, 
albeit one that is not unique to the lawyering field. That difficulty is 
this: the experts have a substantially limited ability to effect within 
practice the results which their theories contemplate. This is particularly 
true in the moral lawyering debate. The discourse about the moral 
value of lawyering and about the implications of a lawyer's situated 
role on her accountability for her actions is extraordinarily sophisticat-
ed. It draws on impressive traditions of metaethics, epistemology, and 
moral philosophy. But this discourse can never emerge with final an-
swers; most of the practice choices are left to those who are the object 
of the discourse, the practicing lawyers, whose sophistication is almost 
always in areas different from philosophy. Absent an effective connect-
ing translation between the two, the philosophers' debate is of dubious 
use to those whom it is intended to aid. 
In this Article I describe ways in which the philosophic debate 
aids good faith lawyers, as well as the ways lawyers are stranded by it. 
The philosophic debate aids lawyers through its articulation of an ori-
entation toward practice that credits the lawyers' moral sensibilities. It 
strands those lawyers, though, by its implied message that accomplish-
ing moral reconciliation of the competing interests within lawyering 
calls for deeply sophisticated philosophical reasoning. To make these 
9. A great deal of what the philosophers accomplish is descrfptive and analytical, without 
necessarily intending to direct lawyers' lives in a particular way. See WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, 
ElHICS 4-5 (1963) (comparing analytical and critical thinking in moral philosophy with norma-
tive, applied ethics). Much of the work of recent philosophers has been criticized, in fact, for 
its lack of connection to real world experience. See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse 
of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1627, 1641-42 (1993). Those complaints 
notwithstanding, much of applied ethics is directly intended to aid practice judgments. See id. 
at 1627; BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND 11IE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 3-11 (1985). 
10. An integral part of my argument here is the idea that moral philosophy intends to 
affect practice. Moral philosophy is, in other words, prescriptive in addition to, or as opposed 
to, descriptive or analytical. Some have argued that the "applied ethics" task of moral philoso-
phy can only be prescriptive, in that "moral theory does not describe an existent world; at best 
it guides the conduct of one species of living things within that world." ANNETTE BAIEl, POS-
WRES OF THE MIND: ESSAYS ON MIND AND MORALS 209 (1985). 
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points, I shall describe a lawyer/client experience of some moral ambi-
guity taken directly from the practice I observe in my clinical teaching. 
From that description, I shall analyze the kinds of choices left to law-
yers by the activist models constructed by the philosophers. This ac-
count shows that the activist vision cannot sidestep substantial risks in 
its implementation, risks driven by its inherent reliance on non-philoso-
pher discretionary judgments unaccompanied by a reliable method by 
which to exercise that discretion. As I use an example from a legal aid 
setting, its account will also show some of the (perhaps 
counterintuitive) conservative tendencies of the activist vision when that 
vision encounters poor clients. This conservative consequence might not 
be a criticism in and of itself, but it helps to recognize some unstated 
implications of the standards chosen by the philosophers for their activ-
ist model. 
Before I describe the interactions in the clinic, I shall introduce 
the activist model. As shall be seen, the ongoing controversy about the 
nature of an activist role leaves the task of identifYing it for implemen-
tation purposes itself a tricky endeavor. 
II. CONSTRUCTING A WORKING IMAGE OF MORALLY 
ACTIVIST LAWYERING 
We encounter certain difficulties when we endeavor to articulate a 
reasonably coherent vision of this moral activism. Such a vision should 
be congruent with the philosophers' teachings and should differ in 
some observable way from the traditional view that lawyers have pos-
sessed of their roles in the past. The problem, though, is that the activ-
ists do not speak with anything close to one voice. Disagreements exist 
at quite fundamental levels, reflecting in many cases controversies with-
in moral philosophy that are decades, or even centuries, in the making. 
To describe one activist vision, then, I would need either to resolve 
those controversies, or ignore them in some way. Neither choice seems 
quite principled. This difficulty represents a central element of my 
argument in this Article, which is that lawyers who choose to be activ-
ist cannot avoid precisely this quandary. In order to justifY her chosen 
brand of activism, that lawyer must overlook or resolve arbitrarily 
some of the metaethical11 questions with which the philosophers strug-
II. My use of the tenn "metaethics" or "metaethical" in this article may not correspond 
precisely to that tenn's accepted meaning within the study of philosophy. Philosophers em-
ploy "metaethics" to capture a different concern from "nonnative ethics," which asserts or de-
fends partiCUlar versions of the good or the worthwhile. Nonnative ethics is in this way sub-
stantive. Metaethics, in contrast, asks such "process" questions as: What is the meaning or use 
of the expressions "(morally) right" or "good"? How can ethical and value judgments be es-
HeinOnline -- 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 13 1995-1996
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gle. 
I proceed amidst this difficulty by describing first the broadest 
shared view of activism, along with a brief history of the philosophers' 
debate within that shared conception. I then focus on the two most 
prominent versions of activism, those inspired by David Luban and 
William Simon. These two prototypes can then serve as a basis for my 
later observations of the student work in a clinical setting. 
A. THE PHILOSOPHERS' CRITIQUES 
As described earlier,12 moral activism in its broadest sense de-
mands accountability from lawyers for their actions, and tends not to 
permit the mere fact of occupational role expectations to justify lawyer 
conduct. The morally activist view appeared first, it seems, with Rich-
ard Wasserstrom's 1975 polemic questioning whether it ought to be 
right for lawyers to do free from censure things that those who are not 
lawyers could not do in similar shameless fashion: 3 Wasserstrom's 
article was descriptive and questioning, but not particularly prescriptive. 
Other writers developed his critique, however, and began to structure 
an alternative view of lawyer role which would try to accommodate his 
concerns. The following year Charles Fried published his famous (or 
infamous) contrasting article Lawyer as Friend, which defended the 
standard conception of lawyer role by stressing its value in enhancing 
client and lawyer autonomy.14 Together the Wasserstrom and Fried 
articles set the contours of the ensuing conversation. IS In the late 
tablished or justified? Can they be justified at all? See FRANKENA, supra note 9, at 5; see 
also WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 72 (ethics make "substantive claims about what one should 
do, how one should live, what was worthwhile," but metaethics "concem[s] itself with the 
status of those claims: whether they could be knowledge, how they could be validated, whether 
they were (and in what sense) objective .... "). My use of the metaethics term inten.js to 
capture and refer to the philosophers' critiques of legal ethics in a broad and systematic way, 
as contrasted with more particular claims about the ethical propriety of certain lawyering con-
ducL 
12. See supra p. 2. 
13. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 
1-2 (1975-1976) [hereinafter Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals]. I may give Wasserstrom 
undeserved credit here, as some see the same issues raised by early 20th century scholars and, 
indeed, by the Federalists. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. 
REv. I, 14-17 (1988) (citing for the "'republican ideal of the lawyer's public role" Louis 
Brandeis and Federalist lawyers "nourished on Montesque"). Others have linked the question at 
hand back to Plato. Cf. James B. White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato·s Gorgias and the 
Modern Lauyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849, 849-50 (1983); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., 
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 1095 (2d ed. 1994) (reprinting Plato's Gorgias). 
14. Fried, supra note I. 
15. This 1970s colloquy followed by several years Monroe Freedman's controversial de-
fense of the adversary system within the context of criminal defense work. See MO:Jroe 
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1970s, Murray Schwartzl6 and Gerald Postemal7 crafted sophisticated 
objections to Fried's (and the traditional) nonaccountability arguments, 
William Simon produced a profound deconstruction of the adversary 
system, challenging traditional role views in a more critical way,IS and 
Alan Goldman offered a philosopher's sophisticated view of an activist 
lawyer's world.19 It was David Luban, though, who established the 
issue of role morality in the central position it possesses in legal ethics 
today. In 1983, Luban edited The Good Lawyer,2° a rich collection of 
philosophical and legal essays written by prominent philosophers and 
law scholars about the "good lawyer versus good person" question. He 
followed that effort in 1988 with Lawyers and Justice,21 an articulate 
and advanced defense of the activist conception. Lawyers and Justice 
provoked two sophisticated responses, with rejoinders from Luban.22 
That same year saw the publication of William Simon's pioneering 
article, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering.23 In this significant work, Si-
mon presented an activist model that departs from the customary "role 
morality" language by arguing that legal merit and justice, and not 
morality, ought to serve as the governing criterion for an activist 
stance. While neither Simon nor any other scholar has yet refined 
Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest 
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966). While the "moral activism" debate focuses virtually 
exclusively on civil, and exempts criminal, representation, Freedman's eloquent (if misguided) 
championing of the criminal defense lawyer developed many of the themes later relied upon 
within the traditionalist scholarship. 
16. Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. 
REv. 669, 673-74 (1978) (introducing the "non accountability" principle, and arguing that, what-
ever the merits of that principle within litigation, it is unjustified in negotiation and similar 
non-litigation contexts). 
17. Postema, supra note 8, at 64 (arguing that "the [standard] conception must be aban-
doned, to be replaced by a conception that better allows the lawyer to bring his full moral 
sensibilities to play in his professional role"). 
18. Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 7. 
19. ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 90-155 
(1980). 
20. LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note I. 
21. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6. 
22. Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 
116 (1990) [hereinafter Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice] (reviewing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS 
AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988»; David Luban, Partisanship. Betrayal and Autonomy 
in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1004 
(1990) [hereinafter Luban, Partisanship. Betrayal and Autonomy]; David Wasserman, Should a 
Good Lawyer Do the Right Thing? David Luban on the Morality of Adversary Representation, 
49 MD. L. REv. 392 (1990); David Luban, Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some 
Mid-Course Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49 MD. L. REV. 424 (1990) [hereinafter 
Lub,n, Mid-Course Corrections]. 
23. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988) 
[herdnafter Simon, Ethical Discretion]. 
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Simon's critique beyond his 1988 formulation, his attractive argument 
for ethical discretion has garnered great attention within the acade-
my.24 As noted earlier, Luban and Simon remain the two most promi-
nent spokespersons for activism, appearing regularly in modem ethics 
scholarship.25 Few scholarly efforts, though, have sought to contrast 
the two from the standpoint of legal practice.26 
My brief history of activist development cannot be compete with-
out a mention of two other contributors, Thomas Shaffer and Gerald 
Lopez. The emergence of moral activism owes an enormous intellectual 
debt to Shaffer, who has championed a virtuous role for lawyers since 
the 1970s.27 Shaffer's avowedly religious and theological perspective 
on lawyering contrasts with the more secular philosophical arguments 
of most of the activist debate,28 as does his attention to virtue and 
24. Simon's article has been excerpted in several professional responsibility coursebooks. 
See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS By THE PERVASIVE 
METHOD 3-38 (1994) [hereinafter RHODE, PERVASIVE METHOD]; RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 
7, at 186; THOMAS B. METZLOFF, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ANTHOLOGY (1994); ROBERT 
H. ARONSON ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 26-36 (2d ed. 1995); GEOFFREY C. HAZ-
ARD, JR. & DEBORAH H. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 
215 (3d ed. 1994). The article has been frequently cited by other ethics scholars as well. 
Search of Westlaw, TP-ALL database (Feb. 17, 1995) (76 articles citing the work). 
25. In addition to sources already cited, the "morally activist lawyering" debate has includ-
ed: Erwin ChemerinskY, Protecting Lawyers from their Profession: Redefining the Lawyer's 
Role, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 31 (1980); Susan Wolf, Ethics, Legal Ethics. and the Ethics of Law, 
in LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note I. at 38; Kenny Hegland, Quibbles, 67 TEX. L. 
REv. 1491 (1989); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. 
REv. 589, 605 (1985); GOLDMAN, supra note 19; Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morali-
ty for Lawyers. 51 MD. L. REv. 853 (1992); Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, supra note 6; Gordon, 
supra note 4; Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That? ": Attorney-Client Deliberation 
Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonc/ients. 68 N.C. L. REv. 213 (1990) [here-
inafter Margulies, Interests of Nonclients]; Jamie G. Heller, Note, Legal Counseling in the Ad-
ministrative State: How to Let the Client Decide, 103 YALE LJ. 2503 (1994). For those who 
are sympathetic in large part but not joining in the activist critique, see. for example, Robert 
P. Lawry. The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 311 (1990); Grif-
fin, supra note I; Timothy W. Floyd, Realism. Responsibility and the Good Lawyer: 
Niebuhrian Perspectives on Legal Ethics, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 587 (1992). 
26. The one in-depth comparison of the two activist exemplars offers a critique from the 
perspective of moral philosophy, and less from the world of practice. See Atkinson, supra note 
25. 
27. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, A Lesson From Trollope, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
727 (1978); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME L. 
REv. 231 (1979) [hereinafter Shaffer, Moral Discourse]; THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A 
CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (\981); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS (1985); 
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. REV. 963 (1987); 
THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSI-
BILITY (1994). 
28. See. e.g., Atkinson, supra note 25, at 944-45 (searching for a more persuasive ground-
ing for ethical truth than religious faith). 
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character, instead of the more common attention to conduct and ac-
tions.29 Each of these characteristics of Shaffer's work leads him to 
appear somewhat less central in the ethicists debate, but his influence 
cannot be underestimated. If Shaffer's influence is a religious one, that 
of Gerald Lopez is a political one. Lopez may have written less direct-
ly about the profession-wide questions of lawyers and moral responsi-
bility, but deserves considerable credit for rethinking the moral relation-
ship and interactions between lawyers and poor clients.3o In his con-
struction of a politically-charged and non-hierarchical lawyer/client 
relationship, Lopez has defined "activism" for many progressive law-
yers.3) His activism, and that of the proponents of "critical lawyering 
in the field,,,32 though, is not synonymous with the vision I describe 
and discuss here. It is quite consistent with the moral activists' demand 
that lawyers be accountable for their actions,33 but maintains a stance 
of resistance and "political unity" to "achieve justice" for poor per-
sons.34 I describe below how the agenda of morally activist lawyering 
might conflict with this more openly political agenda.35 
The development of the activist conception did not proceed with-
out articulate reactions from defenders of the standard conception. Be-
sides Charles Fried, authors such as Stephen Pepper,36 Monroe Freed-
man,37 Ted Schneyer,38 and Serena Stier,39 among others,40 formed 
29. See David Luban, The Legal Ethics of Radical Communitarianism: A Review of Ameri-
can Lawyers and Their Communities By Thomas L Shaffer and Mary M Shaffer, 60 TENN. L. 
REv. 589, 591-92 (1993) [hereinafter Luban, Radical Communitarianism] (responding to this 
contrast in focus). 
30. See GERALD P. LopEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRES-
SIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992). 
31. The most prominent voices within the "new lawyering" movement build off Lopez's 
commitment to client voice and empowerment, and to mobilization of disempowered groups. 
See, e.g., Anthony A. Alfieri. Practicing Community, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1747 (1994); Lucie 
White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 
I CLINICAL L. REv. 157, 158 n.4 (1994) [hereinafter White, From Rhetoric to Practice] (call-
ing Lopez "the major theorist of collaborative lawyering"); Louise Trubek, Critical Lawyering: 
Towards a New Public Interest Practice, I RU. PUB. INT. LJ. 49 (1991). 
32. White, From Rhetoric to Practice, supra note 31, at 158. 
33. See Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, supra note 6, at 2502-05. 
34. White, From Rhetoric to Practice, supra note 31, at 158. See also Richard D. 
Marsico, Working for Social Change and Preserving Client Autonomy: Is There a Role for 
"Facilitative" Lawyering?, I CLINICAL L. REv. 639 (1995); William H. Simon, The Dark Se-
cret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, 
Post-Reagan Era (1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (criticizing the "new 
lawyering" scholarship for attending too little to these ideals of political action). 
35. See infra notes 113-42 and accompanying text. 
36. Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Role: A Defonse. A Problem, and Some Possi-
bilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 613, 615-24 [hereinafter Pepper, Amoral Role]. 
37. MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 44-58 (1990). Freedman has 
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a loyal-if not unified-opposition to the developing critique. The fol-
lowing pages canvass many of the differences between these traditional-
ist defenders and the activists. 
Despite, or maybe because of, the lively debate, both between the 
activists and the traditionalist and among the activist themselves, about 
how one might accommodate moral integrity and good lawyering, the 
philosophical underpinnings of this movement remain very much with-
out consensus. Even if one is taken by the visceral moral force of the 
argument that lawyers ought to own greater responsibility for their in-
role actions, the details and implications of that argument remain rather 
elusive. The philosophers, intrigued as they are by the moral philoso-
phy challenge that this puzzle presents, have been somewhat less atten-
tive to the practice implications of their teachings. If lawyers are now 
less confident that the traditional conception protects them from moral 
accountability, they are likely also to be reasonably uncertain about 
what the activist alternative represents. 
This uncertainty reflects the several disagreements, some factual 
and some philosophical, that pervade recent scholarship about role 
morality. A significant subject of controversy is whether traditional 
practice is in fact troublesome,41 as the activists charge, and whether 
written recently that he has "erroneously, and repeatedly" been identified as a supporter of the 
standard conception. Monroe Freedman, The Morality of Lawyering, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 30, 
1993, quoted in RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 7, at 180-81. Freedman clarifies his stance as 
holding the lawyer responsible for her choice of clients, but thereafter not responsible for any 
legal actions taken at the client's direction. Id. 
38. Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 
WISC. L. REv. 1529, 1550-56 [hereinafter Schneyer, Standard Misconception]. 
39. Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 560-72, 575-
80, 582-87 (1991). 
40. Other defenders of the standard conception, or critics of the new activism, include 
M.B.E. Smith, Should Lawyers Listen to Philosophers About Legal Ethics?, 9 LAW & PHIL. 67 
(1990) [hereinafter Smith, Should Lawyers Listen]; Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice, supra note 
22; Richard Matasar, The Pain of Moral Lawyering, 75 IOWA L. REv. 975 (1990); cJ. Stephen 
Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer Be a Bad Person?, 84 MICH. L. REv. lOll (1986) (advocating a 
guarded defense of the adversary system). For a less ideological but ultimately unsympathetic 
view of the moral activism arguments, see Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge 
About Legal Sanctions, 92 MICH. L. REv. 261 (1993) (arguing that attention by lawyers to 
moral concerns or fairness will tend to discourage socially valuable advice). 
41. Luban, for instance, reads the landscape of practice as requiring, and in fact exhibit-
ing, excessive zeal and conscienceless behavior. See Luban, Adversary System Excuse, in 
LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 1, at 99 [hereinafter Luban, Adversary System ex-
cuse]. Some disagree. See. e.g., Schneyer, Standard Misconception, supra note 38, at 1544-55; 
Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 14-17 (1991) [here-
inafter Schneyer, Hired Gun]; Stier, supra note 39, at 572-73. For a colloquy that addresses in 
part the empirical question, see Smith, Should Lawyers Listen. supra note 40; David Luban, 
Smith Against the Ethicists, 9 LAW & PHIL. 417 (1991); M.B.E. Smith, Reply to David Luban, 
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the standards that govern that practice contribute to whatever trouble 
exists.42 If it is indeed troublesome, one must then confront the philo-
sophical underpinnings of "role morality." Most, but not all, activist 
writers accept the premise of ethical role differentiation.43 Other phi-
losophers, both activist sympathizers44 and standard conception defend-
ers,45 contest that premise.46 Those who acknowledge differentiation 
10 LAW & PHIL. 427 (1991). 
42. Most of the writers answer this question in the affinnative. See, e.g., Luban, Partisan-
ship, Betrayal and Autonomy, supra note 22, at 1013-17; Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra 
note 7, at 82-83; Postema, supra note 8, at 64. Others disagree. See, e.g., Stier, supra note 39, 
at 554; Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice, supra note 22, at I 18; Schneyer, Standard Misconcep-
tion, supra note 38, at 1550-66. 
There are, at the same time, voices from the more conservative wing of the academic 
world whose descriptions resemble far more closely those of the activist critics, but whose 
prescriptions appear unsympathetic to those from the activist scholars. See, e.g., M.A. 
GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 203-15 (1994) (recounting professionalism's decline but 
attributing that decline, in part, to the increase in critical teaching and scholarship among law 
professors); ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF mE LEGAL PROFES-
SION (1993) (like Glendon, bemoaning loss of professionalism, and attributing partial blame to 
critical legal studies' influence on law teaching). Writers like Glendon and Kronman do not ad-
dress the activist proposals directly, and are not. it seems, critics of the adversary system, but 
their descriptions of the misuse and abuse of legal talent echoes that of the activist critics. By 
their nostalgia for a past era of shared commitment to professional values and practical reason 
they express a fundamental faith in the system as it is, and see any failings that we now ex-
perience as reflections of a diminution in the respect accorded to that system by today's schol-
ars, especially the critical ones. It seems unlikely, then, that we might count Glendon and 
Kronman as "activists" as I use that tenn here. Kronman does cite Luban's and Simon's work 
approvingly, see id. at 365-67, and expresses there some measure of sympathy for their pleas 
for more responsible lawyering, but on the whole his grounded trust in the existing institutions 
differentiates him from the more critical scholars who represent the activist view. See Peter 
Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1139, 1146 (1995) 
(reviewing ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF mE LEGAL PROFES-
SION (1993». 
43. Luban, most notably, argued originally that one must continually balance one's profes-
sional role with the demands of "ordinary morality," deciding in each case which one ought to 
prevail. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 155; see also Luban, Adversary System 
Excuse, supra note 41, at II7-18. Luban later recanted that fonnulation for one which privi-
leges role obligations as "defeasible" but overridden in appropriately serious circumstances. 
Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 22, at 434-35 (responding to Wassennan, supra 
note 22). For others who have attended to the problem of role morality, see Richard 
Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER 25, supra note 1 [hereinafter 
Wasserstrom, Roles & Morality]; Alan Donagan, JustifYing Legal Practice in the Adversary 
System, in LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER 125, supra note 1; Virginia Held, The Division of 
Moral Labor and the Role of the Lawyer, in LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER 60, supra note 1; 
Griffin, supra note I. 
44. See Held, supra note 43, at 62; Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice, supra note 22, at 
140; Bernard Williams, Professional Morality and its Dispositions, in LUBAN, THE GOOD LAW-
YER 259, supra note I, at 259. 
45. See Stier, supra note 39. 
46. Those who refuse to adopt the role differentiation conception argue that the premise of 
a "person" role on the one hand and a "professional" role on the other is mistaken, because 
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between in-role and out-of-role obligations search for ways to balance 
the competing demands of the varying obligations.47 That inquiry can-
not help but spill over into that long-standing controversy within ap-
plied ethics about teleological and deontological moral reasoning.48 
The concern here is whether one ought establish such balance through 
rules, using them to maximize good over time ("rule-
consequentialism"), or ought to evaluate the effect of one's actions on 
a case-by-case basis ("act-consequentialism"),49 or ought to act for rea-
sons which are not connected necessarily to maximization of the good, 
but for non-consequential considerations instead ("deontology").so 
The nature of one's moral obligation to obey laws (and the ac-
companying inquiry whether the law in question is ''valid''),;1 and the 
there is no such concept of a "person" role unconnected to a particular circumstance, be it 
lawyer, parent, student, friend, neighbor, or what have you. See Held, supra note 43, at 66-67; 
Williams, supra note 44, at 260-61. 
47. Luban argued in LQlryers and Justice that one balances the two considerations on an 
act-by-act basis, and that where the demands of ordinary morality outweigh those of the role 
(whose weight is dependent on its institutional justification, which in civil litigation is rather 
weak), one may not perform the role-obligation without moral consequences. LUBAN, LAWYERS 
& JUSTICE, supra note 6, at ISS. David Wasserman took Luban to task for this "act-
consequentialist" approach to moral analysis of daily work life, Wasserman, supra note 22, at 
395-97, and Luban agreed that his original formulation was partially in error. Luban, Mid-
Course Corrections, supra note 22, at 434-35. Luban now maintains that role obligations are 
entitled to "defeasible" respect; they will be overridden only when the demands of ordmary 
morality are sufficient to overcome a rebuttable presumption. 
48. For an introduction to these concepts, see FRANKENA, supra note 9, at 14-17; J.J.C. 
SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 9-12 (1973). 
49. As Bernard Williams is so often quoted as asking, "Whatever the general utility of 
having a certain rule, if one has actually reached the point of seeing that the utility of break-
ing it on a certain occasion is greater than that of following it, then surely it would be pure 
irrationality not to break it?" BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ElHlCS 
102 (1972), quoted in LUBAN. LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 122; Luban, Mid-Course 
Corrections. supra note 23, at 444. 
50. FRANKENA, supra note 9, at 16-17, 23-28; Wasserman. supra note 22, at 404; Luban, 
Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 22, at 428-33. Several other commentators on professional 
role morality understand these distinctions to have significant implications for this realm of 
moral philosophy. See. e.g., Atkinson, supra note 25; Donagan, supra note 43; Postema, supra 
note 8. 
51. David Luban spends a significant portion of Lauyers and Justice exploring these ques-
tions. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 31-49. David Wasserman's review essay, 
Wasserman, supra note 22, at 404-14, as well as Luban's rejoinder, Luban, Mid-Course Cor-
rections, supra note 22, at 453-62, refine the arguments. Rob Atkinson allots a substantial sec-
tion of his critique of Luban and Simon to this question as well. Atkinson, supra note 25, at 
889-947. 
The importance of the question to role morality is not entirely self-evident, and arises 
from different sources depending on the activist theory one considers. For Luban, for example, 
the question affects his arguments about lawyers and the neutral partisanship principles, \vhich 
"treat all laws as mere obstacles to or instruments of client interest." Luban, Mid-Course Cor-
rections, supra note 22, at 453. By demonstrating that the law has a moral, as opposed to a 
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fundamental debates about objectivity, skepticism, and relativism-the 
metaethical questions about the choice of standards when one "does 
ethics"52-are matters which necessarily belong, and do appear, within 
this philosophical exploration. The activists also debate whether "mo-
rality" ought to be the relevant criterion at all for assessing lawyer 
behavior. Most scholars accept "morality" as the dispositive consider-
ation (whether "ordinary,,,53 "common,"54 "trlbal,"55 "universal,,,s6 
"professional,,,57 or "role"S8), but, as we have seen, William Simon 
disagrees, proposing instead a standard of legal merit or justice as a 
more coherent evaluative measure. 59 
purely force-based obligation, Luban may then discredit the partisanship attitude, which ignores 
the moral content of legal obligation. For Simon the question is perhaps more directly relevant. 
Since he espouses adherence to a standard of legal merit, Simon implicitly acknowledges an 
obligation, moral or otherwise, to accept the law as binding. As Simon's thesis is largely a 
purposivist one, grounded in a commitment to "legal merit," see Simon, Ethical Discretion, 
supra note 23, at 1128, it follows that he views fidelity to law as a compelling moral force. 
Unlike Luban, however, his arguments do not address that premise directly. Rob Atkinson criti-
cizes Simon, in part, for this deficiency. See Atkinson, supra note 25, at 889-95. Other writers 
within the activist sphere enter this debate as well. /d. at 889-95, 948-49; GOLDMAN, supra 
note 19, at 34-38; Griffin, supra note 1. at 582-87. A related debate within professional ethics 
concerns how one treats law-in-action versus law-in-the-books when counseling clients about 
their future conduct, and how to differentiate advice from assistance in wrongdoing. See, e.g., 
Stephen Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Ethics and Jurispru-
dence of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995) [hereinafter Pepper, Counseling]. 
52. Much of the activist undertaking is intended to reconcile professional needs with the 
dictates of morality, however defined. While some elude the question. Luban has been criti-
cized for his reliance on "common morality" as a notion which has recognizable substance. See 
Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice, supra note 22, at 129-31; Atkinson, supra note 25, at 932-33; 
see also Reed E. Loder, Out From Uncertainty: A Model of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 2 
S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 89, 134 (1993). 
Legal ethicists often offer "ordinary morality" as the standard by which the lawyer 
judges and resists the client's ends. Indeed, legal ethics literature has made this cru-
cial phrase familiar but includes remarkably little discussion of its content. The 
content of this idea is equivocal to say the least. 
[d. (citing Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Profossionals, supra note 13, at 3-9) (footnotes omitted). 
Many activist writers directly address the question of the reliability and sources of moral judg-
ment. A purely relativist thinker will approach activism from a perspective very different from 
that of another who believes in some foundation for ethical judgments. See Reed E. Loder, 
Moral Skepticism and Lawyers, 1990 UTAH L. REv. 47, 52-57 [hereinafter Loder, Moral Skep-
ticism]; Atkinson, supra note 25. at 867-72; see also Judith W. DeCew, Moral Conflicts and 
Ethical Relativism, 101 ETHICS 27 (1990) (canvassing the relativist and objectivist arguments). 
53. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 125. 
54. [d. at 105; Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 22, at 435; Griffin, supra note 
1, at 266; ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY 29 (1977). 
55. RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 7. at 145 (quoting Andrew Oldenquist, Loyalties, 79 J. 
PHIL. 173, 176 (1982». . 
56. Wasserstrom, Roles & Morality, supra note 43, at 32. 
57. Williams, supra note 44, at 259. 
58. Held, supra note 43, at 66. 
59. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 23. at 1090-91. Rob Atkinson challenges Luban 
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While not exhaustive,60 this list captures the tenor of academics' 
and philosophers' debate. Two things seem certain about this debate: 
first, the experts will not soon resolve their differences nor achieve 
consensus on any of those questions (Luban calls these matters "diffi-
cult issues that no one ever gets right anyway,,61); and second, those 
lacking expertise, the non-philosopher lawyers, will tend to be more 
uncertain about how to resolve the disagreements than the experts, but 
(perhaps unlike the philosophers) will need to act upon the matters 
subject to the debate. Where, then, does that leave practicing lawyers 
committed to constructing an ethical work life? Where does it leave 
for his reliance on ordinary morality, and Simon for his reliance on justice or legal merit. 
Atkinson argues that both employ inappropriately "objective" and public norms as replacements 
for the prevailing norms of the standard conception. Atkinson, supra note 25, at 889-947. 
60. Excluded because they seemed not to fit directly, but important in a peripheral way to 
the activist debate, are the issues of: 
1) "character" as a moral force (see KRONMAN, supra note 5, at 16; MacIntyre, supra 
note 2; Griffin, supra note I, at 263-66, 274-75; Shaffer, Moral Discourse, supra note 27, at 
244-53; Williams, supra note 44; MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND TIlE LAW 97-99 (1993», 
2) the impact of "legal realism" on the activist project (see Pepper, Amoral Role, supra 
note 36, at 624-33; David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 
637, 646-49), and 
3) the importance of narrative and stories within morally activist lawyering (see Peter 
Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Re-
publican View of Difforence and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. V. L. REv. 695 (1994» 
[hereinafter Margulies, Civic Republican View]. 
I have also not included within my canvass of activist themes the "new lawyering" 
scholarship and the subjects it explores. See. e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty 
Law and Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107 (1991); L6pEZ, 
supra note 30; Lucie White, Subordination. Rhetorical Survival Skills. and Sunday Shoes: Notes 
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. I (1990); Symposium, The Theoretics of Prac-
tice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 717 (1992). This 
work is a central part of contemporary legal ethics, but differs in several respects from the 
philosophers' project that I describe here. It is premised less on moral philosophy, is more 
political, and is less generalizable to private market lawyering than, say, the Luban/Simon de-
bate might be. And, while there are several areas of overlap (e.g., the "new lawyering" schol-
ars are certainly "activist," and represent a search for moral integrity within this profession), I 
argue below that the goals of critical poverty law may not meld well with the suggestions 
from the moral activists. See infra notes 175-86 and accompanying text 
61. Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 22, at 424. Luban proceeds: "Moral philos-
ophy is like the clarinet, the instrument Benny Goodman once defined as 'an ill woodwind that 
nobody blows good .... Id. The frequency within ethics literature of criticism of moral philoso-
phy for its inveterate uncertainty, its incomprehensibility, and its lack of relevance to practical 
issues, is remarkable. In addition to Luban's remarks, Martha Nussbaum quotes Cicero: "Their 
[the philosophers'] narrow little syllogistic arguments prick their hearers like pins. Even if they 
assent intellectually, they are no way changed in their hearts, but they go away in the same 
condition in which they came." Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1642 (quoting CICERO, DE FINIBUS 
4.7). Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that modem moral philosophy is of little use to the practi-
cal professions because its "disputes between rival and conflicting rules . . . are in fact ratio-
nally insoluble." MacIntyre, What Has Ethics to Learn, supra note 2, at 42. 
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law students and their teachers? 
One way to begin to address these questions would be to compare 
two suggested activist models, without pretending to have resolved the 
intellectual debates that might separate the two. We do have available 
two rather distinct "models" of activism, one from Simon and the other 
from Luban, each fairly accessible to lawyers and each in its own way 
achieving some provisional resolution of the above issues. I use the 
next section to introduce each, and later in this Article I then try to 
apply the two to some concrete lawyering experiences. 
B. Two ACTIVIST MODELS: LUBAN AND SIMON 
While the philosophers engage in the debates just described, two 
contrasting visions of activism remain prominent in both teaching and 
scholarship. David Luban's "common morality" based conception62 and 
William Simon's "legal merit," or ''justice'' based, conception63 are the 
two versions of non~traditional lawyering which have received the most 
intense attention. Together the two offer lawyers a plausible choice 
between competing arguments about the underpinnings of an activist 
stance. An activist~sympathizing lawyer feeling perplexed or over-
whelmed by the philosophy debates just described might comfortably 
choose between a Luban and a Simon approach to her work, if only 
because the two are the most visible choices and differ in understand-
able ways. 
1. David Luban's Commitment to Common Morality 
It is not my purpose here to describe in great detail the Luban 
thesis, but I do need to highlight two aspects of his work if we are to 
understand the message to a lawyer in practice. First, there is Luban's 
underlying skepticism about the adversary system excuse. Luban em-
ploys what he terms the "Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reasoning,,64 to 
demonstrate that lawyers ought not be morally exempt from criticism 
because they are performing an important role within the adversary 
system. Whenever a person in a role intends to act in a way which, 
but for that role, would be morally troublesome, and wishes to employ 
the role as a justification for acting in that way, she must rely upon 
the Fourfold Root, which Luban describes as follows: 
62. See LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 105. 
63. See Simon, Ethical Discretion. supra note 23, at 1090. 
64. I offer here, as references to this phrase commonly do, the obligatory footnote point-
ing out that Luban regrets the in artfulness of this phrase, which in fact is a pun of sorts with-
in philosophical circles. See Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 22, at 426-27. 
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[T]he institutional excuse, fully spelled out, will take the [follow-
ing] fonn . . . : the agent (1) justifies the institution by demon-
strating its moral goodness; (2) justifies the role by appealing to 
the structure of the institution; (3) justifies the role obligations by 
showing that they are essential to the role; and (4) justifies the 
role act by showing that the obligations require it.65 
23 
Luban's argument is that mere reliance on a role is insufficient to justi-
fy questionable actions, but using ordinary morality as a trump is 
equally inappropriate.66 The Fourfold Root suggests a method of sepa-
rating those acts that have justification because of their institutional role 
flavor from those that do not. Luban contends that this justificatory 
process and analysis may be applied by practicing lawyers in the 
"hurley-burley" of their practice.67 
The standard by which he expects assessment of (but not trump-
ing of) role acts is that of ordinary morality,68 which Luban argues is 
susceptible to coherent understanding.69 In his Fourfold Root analysis 
Luban affords a weak justification to the adversary system, the "prag-
matic" realization that the system, despite its flaws, seems to be as 
effective as any other system. Thus, a lawyer's deliberations cannot 
rely heavily on that system to license acts that otherwise would be 
significantly troublesome from a standard of common morality. When 
the justification for the role-acts are insufficient to trump moral consid-
erations, several things follow: at a minimum, the lawyer must accept 
moral responsibility for her actions;70 she also ought not continue to 
assist that clienfl and, in some instances, she may be justified in be-
traying her client. 72 
65. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 131. 
66. Luban, Mid-Course Corrections. supra note 22, at 434-35. 
67. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 140-41. See infra notes 155-56 and 
accompanying text (discussing Luban's "seven step" process of weighing role obligations). 
6S. Luban later qualifies the arguments he made in Lawyers and Justice about an equal 
balance between role obligations and common morality and moves to a position in which role 
morality is the defeasible default position. Compare LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 
6, at 125 with Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 22, at 434-35. 
69. See, e.g., Luban, Partisanship. Betrayal and Autonomy, supra note 22, at 1023-25. 
Luban has been criticized for this characterization of common morality. EHmann, Lawyering for 
Justice, supra note 22, at 129-30. 
70. Luban, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 41, at liS. 
71. LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 173-74. 
72. Luban, Partisanship. Betrayal and Autonomy, supra note 22, at 1026. 
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2. William Simon's Commitment to a Conception of Legal Merits 
William Simon's article Ethical Discretion in Lawyering73 has 
had a significant impact upon the world of legal ethics.74 Like Luban, 
Simon opposes the "neutral partisanship" stance of the traditional de-
fense of advocacy and lawyering, captured by the "zealous advocacy" 
conception so often repeated in conventional ethics discourse.75 Unlike 
Luban, though, Simon rejects the common opposition of "private" mor-
al decision-making to legal decision-making. Instead, Simon proposes a 
realm of "ethical discretion," which he describes as a mandate to law-
yers to "seek justice,,,76 but which, on further reflection, appears to be 
largely purposivist in intent and in implementation. I use the term 
"purposivist" to capture a sense of obligation to respect the obvious 
and apparent purposes of the substantive law77 to "vindicate our legal 
ideals. ,,78 
Simon's conception is more easily cognizable than Luban's, in 
that it relies upon a set of criteria (substantive law standards) for 
which, he argues, we possess more of a common shared language,19 
Yet, Simon's suggestion is also more inscrutable and complex in appli-
cation, in that his definition of "legal merits" encompasses more than a 
straightforward purposivist perspective on substantive law. This point 
needs brief development here if we are to understand how a working 
lawyer might apply Simon's reasoning. 
Simon argues that lawyers ought to possess ethical discretion to 
''take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of the 
particular case, seem most likely to promote justice."so He divides that 
task into two realms, "relative merit" and "internal merit."81 The ques-
73. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 23. 
74. See supra note 24. 
75. See, e.g., ABA CANONS OF ETHICS Canon 15 (1908) ("The lawyer owes 'entire devo-
tion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, and 
the exertion of his utmost learning and ability"'); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBIL-
ITY DR 7-101 (1981) (entitled "Representing a Client Zealously"); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, 
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 579 (1986) ("The principle of zealous regard for a client's interests is 
pivotal . . . ."). 
76. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 23, at 1090. 
77. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 25, at 2509-10; Gordon, supra note 13, at 11-30. 
78. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 23, at 1083-84. 
79. Id. at 1113-14. Simon argues that his approach is "grounded in the lawyer's profes-
sional commitments to legal values." Id. at 1113. The contrasted "nonlegal" (by which he 
means private morality) approach demands distinctions for which "[t]here are currently no gen-
erally accepted guidelines." Id. at 1114. 
80. Id. at 1090. 
81. Id. at 1091. 
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tions of internal merit are of the greater interest for present purposes. 
They are the insights for which Simon has attracted the most atten-
tion.82 The internal merit obligation "requires that the lawyer make her 
best effort to achieve the most appropriate resolution in each case."S3 
Simon takes pains to emphasize that the "most appropriate resolution" 
means the most appropriate legal resolution, not the most appropriate 
moral resolution.84 As he writes, 
[The discretionary approach] differs from many critiques of preva-
lent legal ethics doctrine that would appeal to moral concerns out-
side the legal system against values associated with the legal role. 
The argument here is that ethical discretion would best vindicate 
our legal ideals and contribute to a more effective functioning of 
the lawyer role.8s 
Simon further states, "The discretionary approach is grounded in 
the lawyer's professional commitments to legal values. It rejects the 
common tendency to attribute the tensions of legal ethics to a conflict 
between the demands of legality on the one hand and those of nonle-
gal, personal or ordinary morality on the other."86 
82. I do not mean to imply that the "relative merit" arguments are unimportant. Simon 
brings to private practice generally a theme that has been central to institutional poverty law 
practice for some time. For legal services lawyers, questions of "relative merit" are always 
present, as office staff must determine which low income persons among the population of 
many ought to be accepted as clients of the office. For discussions of the considerations in-
volved in that inquiry, see, e.g., Gary Bellow & Jean Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Con-
fronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REv. 337 (1978); Marc 
Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J. 1529 (1995); Paul R. 
Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REv. 
1101 (1990) [hereinafter Tremblay, Community-Based Ethic]; cf John B. Mitchell, Redefining 
the Sixth Amendment, 67 s. CAL. L. REv. 1215 (1994) (applying "relative merit" standards to 
plight of overworked public defenders). Simon's "relative merit" argument is controversial in 
that it applies a normative client choice theory to private lawyering settings, where free choice 
of clients has been assumed to be the norm. 
83. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 23, at \096. 
84. Simon introduces "internal merit" considerations by pointing out that the traditional ap-
proaches "authorize or require the lawyer to act in a way that she would concede • . . 
frustrates the most legally appropriate resolution of the matter." Id. (emphasis added). He later 
argues that a lawyer's choice of approaches "should depend on which approach seems better 
calculated to vindicate the relevant legal merits." [d. at 1103 (emphasis added). 
85. Id. at 1083-84 (footnote omitted). Simon cites two sources as authority for the ap-
proach he rejects, GOLDMAN, supra note 19, and Wasserstrom, Roles & Morality, supra note 
43. He notably does not cite David Luban in this footnote, despite Luban by 1988 having pub-
lished The Adversary System Excuse, supra note 41, arguing in a sophisticated way for precise-
ly such a law/morality difference. 
86. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 23, at 1113-14 (footnote omitted). Here, again, 
Simon refers only to Alan Goldman and Richard Wasserstrom as authorities for the opposing 
view. See supra note 85. 
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One might rely on these arguments to conclude that Simon has 
offered a "discretionary purposivist" approach to lawyering, by which 
lawyers would choose those actions which are best calculated to 
achieve the goals and intended purposes of the substantive law estab-
lished in generally applicable legal authority. That construction of the 
Simon approach would be workable, if perhaps not without controversy 
and uncertainty. Good faith lawyers might find it within their realm of 
expertise, even if frequently contrary to their desires. 
Yet, Simon's suggested approach, despite the implications one 
might draw from the quoted language above, is not so easily 
purposivist. It is true that Simon urges adherence to legal values, and 
not commitment to ordinary or private morality. But his definition of 
legal values allows for interpretive judgments of "legality" that are 
deeply complex. This stance leaves his suggested proposals far less 
easily transferable to practice, but arguably more principled and more 
advantageous to subordinated or dispossessed clients, as later discussion 
will show. 87 
Simon's insistence that lawyers consider the reliability of dispute 
resolution institutions88 and the clarity of legislative intention89 fits 
nicely into the purposivist interpretation. It is his twist on the topic of 
legislative intent, however, that introduces more complex discretionary 
interpretation, by which lawyers may depart from following even clear 
laws administered by reliable institutions. Consider two of Simon's 
examples. His first is straightforwardly purposivist. It looks at an Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) case in which the administrative intentions 
are unambiguous, and the administrativelbureaucratic procedures are 
inefficient or unreliable for achieving the regulation's goals.90 Simon's 
point is that a lawyer ought not act instrumentally to avoid the IRS 
rule, even if it is arguably "legal" to do SO.9\ Simon contrasts that 
example with one involving a welfare program, Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), whose parallels are striking but whose 
analysis is different.92 The AFDC example shows a comparable rule 
whose purposes seem apparent and whose institutional enforcement 
means are inept or overburdened, in ways which mirror the IRS exam-
87. See infra notes 187-202 and accompanying text. 
88. According to Simon, the more reliable the institution, the more a lawyer ought to act 
formally. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 23, at 1097-98, 1105. 
89. Simon argues that the clearer the legislative intent, the more a lawyer is bound to 
honor it. ld. at 1103. 
90. ld. at 1104-05. 
91. ld. 
92. Simon, Ethical Discretion. supra note 23, at 1105-07, 1115-16. 
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pIe. Simon argues that a lawyer in the welfare case has no, or at least 
considerably less, discretion to defeat the wishes of her client.93 His 
reasoning is that in the welfare case the institutional messages represent 
legal merit less well. Simon accomplishes this in two ways. First, Si-
mon posits that lawyers ought to look not just at the clarity of the 
relevant purposes of the law, but whether or not those purposes are 
"problematic."94 In his words, '''Problematic' purposes are purposes 
that pose an especially grave threat to fundamental legal values."95 
The more problematic the purpose of the law, the more the lawyer is 
entitled to treat the relevant norms formally. In other words, a lawyer 
more comfortably may exploit, in an instrumental way, a norm whose 
purpose is troublesome, even if in doing so the lawyer is frustrating the 
apparent (troublesome) purpose of the norm. 
Second, Simon seeks to include in his commitment to legal ideals 
a conception of "lawyer nullification," through which lawyers in their 
private transaction may disregard otherwise legitimate orders from leg-
islatures or regulators if those laws are "plainly wrong" when judged 
by "[a norm] so fundamental that it amounts to a precondition of legal 
legitimacy."96 In this second approach Simon rejects the simple 
purposivist analysis. He proposes purposivist lawyering when the rele-
vant norms are coherent, legitimate, and not inconsistent with funda-
mental legal values. Otherwise, however, a lawyer is not necessarily 
constrained by a norm even if it is exceptionally clear and is the prod-
uct of what otherwise might be a legitimate political process. 
The broader Simon view is not without analytical difficulty.97 It 
also may not translate easily to a workable ethic for non-philosopher 
practicing lawyers, but it warrants inclusion within the conversations 
that I create below. I opt to differentiate Simon's more narrow 
purposivism from his broader vision of legal-merit-as-justice for the 
purposes of my later discussion. Dividing Simon's conceptions into two 
versions leaves us with three contrasting approaches to the traditional 
paradigm. These approaches are: (1) the ordinary morality version, 
which captures David Luban's thesis, (2) the purposivist version, which 
is the distorted but simplified Simon thesis, and (3) the justice-based 
version, which includes Simon's broad view of legal merit. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. at 1\03. 
95. [d. at 11 04. 
96. [d at 1115-16. 
97. Rob Atkinson has developed an intricate critique of Simon's reliance on such an unde-
fined and unanchored conception of legal merit See Atkinson, supra note 25, at 889-906. 
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Our next task is to apply, or to try to apply, these three renditions 
to actual work one might confront in a legal services office. In this 
examination of practice, my goals will be to compare a morally activist 
stance to the traditional one (again, one expects that the progressive 
proposals would change the fabric of practice in some respects), to 
assess the impact of an activist posture on poverty lawyering, and to 
contrast the three versions of morally activist lawyering in terms of 
effectiveness and coherence. 
III. A LAW STUDENT, AN EVICTION, AND MORAL CONFLICT 
A. INTRODUCING THE CONTEXT OF THE EXAMPLE 
In this Part, I introduce a real example of ethical conflict in a 
practice setting. The story I have chosen is one all too common among 
legal services practitioners. It is frequently cited by legal services oppo-
nents as paradigmatic of the instrumental, amoral use of law that legal 
services lawyers purportedly use for their clients. It is a story of a 
family that failed to pay rent to their landlord and who, when the 
landlord tries to evict them, respond with defenses and counterclaims, 
many of them technical. 98 
Before I recount the facts of this example, I need to address two 
possible objections to my use of this kind of tale as an example 
through which to watch morally activist lawyering. The first objection 
concerns the moral texture of the case I have chosen. The second ob-
jection questions my use of a specialized practice setting such as legal 
services for my observations, which ought to have some applicability 
and relevance to practice generally. I think the latter objection is more 
sound, but I address each and ultimately reject both. 
The example I use is different from those that conventionally 
appear in the moral lawyering literature because of its lack of clear 
moral violation. Most of the activist literature, both supportive and 
critical, tests or defends its differing moral perspectives by pushing 
matters to their moral limit. Readers almost always come upon the 
98. For a distorted, unbelievable. but powerful version of this tale, see the Hollywood film 
PACIFIC HEIGHTS (CBSlFox Studios 1991). Alleged abuse of landlord/tenant law is a common 
theme in literature and popular press accounts critical of legal services practice. See, e.g., H. 
Dennis Beaver, Attorneys Earn Their Low Esteem, CAL. B. J., May 1995, at 8 ("The Legal 
Aid attorney who knowingly helps deadbeat tenants avoid paying rent rationalizes his or her 
actions with two of the sweetest-sounding words in our vocabulary: zealous representation"); 
Stephanie O'Neill, Tenants from Hell: Professional Deadbeats, "Petition Mill" Scam Artists 
Imperil Small Rental Property Owners Unfortunate Enough to Select Them as Renters, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, at K1 (describing abuses of court processes by private "petition mills"). 
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Lake Pleasant Bodies story,99 and frequently the aneurysm case (where 
the teenage boy may die if his opposing lawyer does not reveal his 
fatal condition).loo Readers might at times see the Leo Frank case, 
where a lawyer knows the identity of the perpetrator of a crime but, 
bound by confidentiality, remains silent as a wrongfully accused man is 
convicted of the crime. IOI They often encounter the cross-examination 
of the innocent, truthful rape victim. l02 Even the non-violent among 
the familiar examples possess some unquestionable moral harm: refus-
ing to pay a just debt, for instance. \03 These are tremendously power-
ful examples by which to test one's understanding of the limits of role 
and of accountability. They serve the purposes of the activist architects 
well. To be honest, however, these dramatic conflicts don't happen all 
that often.104 The moral anguish of practice is more nuanced and sub-
tle. Not only are answers less clear, but whether there even is a prob-
lem is often an open question. Yet, the activist suggestions ought to 
apply to the messier, more ambiguous moral world, and the example I 
use tries to capture a small part of it. I, for one (and my students, for 
others, and our opponents, for even more others), find the land-
lord/tenant example to be at the least ethically ambiguous and compli-
cated. lOs 
99. The "Buried Bodies" or "Lake Pleasant Bodies" case refers to People v. Beige, 372 
N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga Co. Ct.), affd, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1975), affd, 359 N.E.2d 371 
(N.Y. 1976). In Beige, a criminal defendant confessed to his lawyers that he had murdered 
three students and told them the location of the bodies. The defense lawyers visited the scene 
and photographed the bodies, but refused to inform the relatives that the students were indeed 
dead. The lawyers were exonerated by the courts and bar officials, relying on the lawyers' 
overriding obligations of confidentiality. 
100. SpaUlding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962). 
\O\. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY 214-15 (3d 
ed. 1984); Deborah L. Rhode, An Adversarial Exchange on Adversarial Ethics: Text, Subtext, 
and Context, 41 J. LEGAL Eouc. 29. 37-38 (1991). 
102. See, e.g., Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy, supra note 22, at 1006; Harry 
Sub in, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission": Reflections on the "Right" to Present a 
False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL Enncs 125, 129-36 (1987). 
103. See Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957) (discussed in Wolf, supra note 25, 
at 46; LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 9-10). 
\04. I have been a practicing lawyer, either directly or through clinic students, for about 16 
years, and I confess that I have never encountered buried bodies, or an undiagnosed aneurysm, 
or a mistaken identity prosecution in any of my work. But my practice is always ethically 
challenging, which is of course my point. 
105. I easily could have reversed the roles, and used for my discussion the "lousy four bill 
landlord tenant case" (see LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 140-42), in which a 
landlord is using proper law to evict a tenant without cause in an unjust fashion. Indeed, the 
ALI Proposed Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers uses that kind of proceeding as an 
example of a possibly "repugnant or imprudent" request by a client which would justifY a 
lawyer's withdrawal from representation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAW-
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But what about the use of a legal services setting? Will that ex-
ample be transferable and useful? My reasons for using the field of 
poverty lawyering for this inquiry are a mix of expedience and curiosi-
ty.l06 The first of the reasons is that this setting is "there." If morally 
activist lawyering is to be accepted by the bar as an alternative concep-
tion of ethical practice, it is likely to happen bec:ause the conception is 
taught to soon-to-be lawyers in law school. If the conception is to 
survive the theorists, it ought to be taught in law school clinics, which 
generally will involve the representation of poor people. Hence, the 
first "laboratory" for morally activist lawyering will be a poverty law 
setting. As one who teaches in such a context, I can draw upon my 
experiences within such a laboratory. 
My second reason is somewhat distorting, but valuable none the 
less. An advantage, but also a weakness, of studying the morally ac-
tivist view within the legal services environment is that virtually all 
YERS § 44 (Tentative Draft No.5, 1992) (including the landlord example along with an as-
sertion of "the statute of limitations against a just claim" as in that genre). For recent schol-
arship which captures the plight of poor tenants and their victimization and vulnerability, see 
Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices 
in Legal Process, 20 HOFSlRA L. REv. 533 (1992); Homer C. La Rue, Developing an Identity 
of Responsible Lawyering Through Experimental Learning, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 1147 (1992); cJ. 
Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1731, 
1740 (1993) (using eviction as an example of "coercive action" by the legal system against 
subordinated persons). 
My reasons for not using the "good tenantlbad landlord" example were several, including 
some developed in the text. I have experience with the case I describe, which assists my appli-
cation of the theories to the practice. I also find the moral implications of my story more 
interesting, with the (arguably) less powerful party the one whose ends are thwarted. One of 
my themes in this work is that some versions of morally activist lawyering will disfavor poor 
clients, and I needed this context to make that point. 
106. Some of my reactions to moral activism drawn from this poverty law setting suggest 
insights applicable to the private world of fee-for-service, as I describe below. In other ways 
the discussion is incomplete because of my chosen specialized setting. and the fee-for-service 
world will need its own exploration in later work. There is one segment of that world, though. 
that has particular applicability to the ideals of moral activism, even if I cannot address it 
here. This is the world of highly regulated clients. from which doctrine is developing mirroring 
in many ways the counter-traditionalist views of the activists. The 1992 Kaye Scholer/Office of 
Thrift Supervision dispute, for example. has caused many to reconsider the usual "full zeal" 
posture of traditional legal education when lawyers work with organizational clients with obliga-
tions beyond the direct organizational constituents. For a sampling of the commentary on Kaye 
Scholer, much of it dealing with precisely that issue. see, e.g.. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer 
Liability in Third' Party Situations: The Meaning of the Kaye Scholer Case, 26 AKRON L. REv. 
395 (1993); In the Matter of Kaye. Scholer. Fierman. Hays & Handler: A Symposium on 
Government Regulation. Lawyers' Ethics. and the Rule of Law, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 977 
(1993); Robert G. Day, Administrative Watchdogs or Zealous Advocates? Implications for Legal 
Ethics in the Face of Expanded Attorney Liability. 45 STAN. L. REv. 645 (1993); Symposium. 
The Attorney-Client Relationship in a Regulated Society, 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 571 (1994). 
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market forces have been defined away, along with their corrupting 
possibilities. At the risk of stating the obvious, it is important to note 
that any moral lawyering stance will be client-unfriendly, almost by 
definition. 107 Any activist stance that we observe will have a premise 
that asserts that lawyers may reject certain client-chosen means or goals 
as ethically inappropriate. The entire thrust of·an activist conception is 
that our traditional conceptions have sanctioned instrumental lawyering 
in an amoral way, permitting or requiring attorneys to act in ways that, 
on reflection, deserve reproach. It will almost always be the case (can 
one conceive of an exception?) that the difference between a traditional 
conception and an activist stance will be that under the former the 
lawyer follows the wishes of her clients, while under the latter the 
lawyer does not. Morally activist lawyering, then, presents some serious 
profitability concerns, especially in a law firm environment where tradi-
tionalists compete with activists. 108 
My purposes here do not include exploring this purported vulnera-
bility of the activist model. By choosing a legal services setting to look 
at the life of an activist lawyer, I have excluded from the problem 
these market-based concerns because, for the most part, the usual mar-
ket forces do not prevail within subsidized poverty law settings. A 
client who is unhappy with his less-client-centered activist lawyer may, 
of course, always opt to terminate the representation, but a poor client 
will almost always have no other place to go. 109 This is a sobering 
107. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 23, at 1127 ("The discretionary approach 
puts the lawyer in opposition to clients by reducing her power to injure others for the sake of 
the client") 
108. See GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 148-49; McG. Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 40, at 
319-22. But see Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, 
in LAWYERS' IDEALSILAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PRO-
FESSION 230, 244-45 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds.. 1992) (arguing that the "race to the bot-
tom" fear is overplayed in the professionalism debates). 
While not precisely in the activist genre, the recent study by Robert Mnookin and Rob-
ert Gilson comparing cooperative with predatory lawyering styles, with an eye toward the prof-
itability and client-benefit advantages of each, offers some hope that the contrast I draw might 
be overstated. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooper-
ation and Conflict Betlveen Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 512-13 (1994). 
This very thoughtful and ambitious article examines the economic and psychological pressures 
that tend to encourage litigants to employ gladiators rather than collaborators, but notes certain 
incentives and practice structures that could reverse those incentives, and make collaborators 
more profitable for clients in certain cases. However, most of Gilson and Mnookin's suggested 
practice structures encouraging cooperative lawyering do not apply easily to a legal services 
setting. 
109. A federally funded legal services office is required by federal law to restrict its clien-
tele by income and by case type. 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(a) (1995) (income ma.ximum); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 1612.1-.12 (1995) (restriction on activities). All such offices establish service areas as well, 
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realization. For present purposes, however, we may use it to test the 
workability of the activist conception virtually unaffected by the con-
cern of mutinous clients. 
There is a final reason for my wish to use legal services as the 
focus of this Article. It has to do with the political implications of the 
activist model. As we can easily see, a morally activist lawyer in legal 
aid will obtain fewer benefits for her client than will a traditional-
ist. 11O Moral activism will "harm" poor people, if we intend the term 
"harm" to include the loss of some benefits the existing system would 
otherwise yield to them. Understanding this fundamental realization 
leads us back to at least one of the concerns among the sophisticated 
philosophers, ethicists, and scholars. Differing versions of morally activ-
ist lawyering will lead to different kinds of "harm" to poor clients. 
That conclusion might affect one's assessment of the competing activist 
models. An activist conception which is grounded in legal purposivism, 
as I read William Simon's more narrow conception, III will be of par-
ticular concern to advocates for the poor if we assume, as I do, that 
legal purposivism tends by and large to be conservative. An activist 
conception grounded in shared notions of ordinary morality, as I read 
David Luban's view,1I2 may be less conservative, although how one 
defines ordinary morality has a significant impact on that score. Simi-
larly, the broad view occasioned by Simon's ''justice'' thesis resembles 
Luban's less constrained standard, which may, by my analysis, be more 
attractive to poverty lawyers. 
The fact that morally activist lawyering might harm poor clients is 
not reason, in itself, to say that the conception is flawed. Poor clients, 
like wealthy clients, ought not be immune to ethical critique; progres-
sive lawyers are obligated to practice responsibly and honorably. But 
the implications of this harm are not insignificant. Consider, for in-
stance, the teaching implications. If nothing else, this harm leaves the 
and persons not living in the geographical catchment area will not be served. Cj 45 C.F.R. § 
1620.3 (1995) (mandating client access within "the [office's] service area"). 
11 O. It is important to stress that my focus on a legal services practice will involve the 
individual client representation model of that practice, and not the model of a public interest 
lawyer with collective agendas and broader purposes. David Luban has developed at some 
length a theory of moral activism in the latter, "public interest" context. See LUBAN, LAWYERS 
& JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 160-61. There are important differences between the two with 
respect to what an activist stance would look like. I choose the former in part because it con-
tains the data I possess (most law school clinical training involves "smaller," individual dis-
putes). and in part because that phenomenon resembles more closely the private attorney/client 
representation model to which this investigation may have some application. 
111. See supra notes 73-97 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text. 
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conception somewhat less attractive as a working model in law school 
clinical settings, particularly among those teacher/lawyers who view 
clients as oppressed and entitled to whatever lawful breaks they might 
be able to obtain. With teacher/lawyers who are less "rebellious" there 
is a contrary concern. Clinical teachers who believe in an activist mod-
el for private lawyering must demonstrate that model in their clinics, 
with poor clients. There is great risk in teaching that activism is a 
superior stance among propertied classes but not among oppressed 
classes, even if that distinction is justifiable. Teachers who adhere to 
this desire for consistency will encourage students to practice moral 
activism in the clinics, with all of its client-unfriendly attributes. This 
has the potential result of encouraging, subtly or otherwise, the biases 
many students bring to law school about the greed and manipulation of 
poor clients in a welfare system. \13 The setting having been set and 
explained, we now tum to an instance of moral ambiguity in ordinary 
practice. 
B. ONE EVICTION STORY (AMONG MANY) 
Christopher was a second year student who enrolled in the law 
school's civil clinic for the Spring semester. His third case of the term 
was the Hunter matter. It was, in the parlance of the office, an "evic-
tion case." The intake form told Christopher that Cathy Hunter was 
thirty-three years old, married to Patrick, age thirty-four, and with two 
children, one age three and the other ten months. Cathy had called the 
clinic after receiving a Summary Process complaint, which is the Mas-
sachusetts device for commencing an eviction proceeding in court. 1 14 
The short write-up noted that the Hunters' landlord claimed that they 
owed $3,750 (or five months) in rent, but that the tenants were com-
plaining ab9ut unsafe and unsanitary conditions at their home. 
Christopher interviewed Cathy, who came in with her two children 
but without Patrick. He found her story compelling. When Cathy 
moved into the apartment about a year ago the building was in the 
process of being taken over by her current landlord, Carl LeBlanc, 
from a bank that had foreclosed on the previous owner's interests. 
Cathy and Patrick dealt with a bank official, not with Carl, in ar-
ranging their rental. The bank representative offered them an incentive 
when they moved in; if they could find a tenant for one of the other 
113. See Margulies, Civic Republican View, supra note 60, at 695, 707-08 (describing stu-
dent stereotyping of clients). 
114. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 239, § 2 (1994). 
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vacant units, they would get a month's rent free. The Hunters were 
able to do this. They knew of a friend's friend who needed an apart-
ment, so they did not have to pay for the second month they lived in 
the unit. 
Cathy described Carl LeBlanc as a nasty, frugal, judgmental, ab-
sentee landlord-in short, not a very nice man. The Hunters had a 
number of serious problems with the apartment from the time they 
moved in, including drafty windows in the winter, mice scurrying 
across the floor, plumbing that did not work right, and an occasional 
lack of hot water. Cathy admitted that they had fallen behind on the 
rent, but not nearly as much as LeBlanc was claiming. She pointed out 
that LeBlanc was not giving them credit for the bank's free month, and 
furthermore had never credited them with some rent they had paid. She 
believed that the family was behind in rent only by about a month and 
a half or two months at most. Cathy had heard from the local tenants' 
organization that, given the problems with the unit, a court should 
forgive that amount. She told Christopher that when the family moved 
in, Patrick was working for a food distributor in town, but he was laid 
off soon after. He had been looking for work off and on, but he also 
applied for disability benefits because of back pain of long duration 
that was getting worse. Cathy asked whether the clinic could help out 
with that issue. In the meantime, the family lived off of Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC), which provided a monthly cash 
grant of $668 for a family of four (which was less than the monthly 
$750 rent), plus $195 in food stamps and Medicaid coverage. 
Cathy was very angry at the landlord. She felt he had been ha-
rassing them ever since they began having trouble paying the rent. On 
three separate occasions, LeBlanc came into the apartment without their 
permission, once' surprising them at 11 :00 a.m. on a Saturday while the 
couple slept on a fold-out couch in the living room. Christopher's in-
terview also turned up the following facts: The landlord had taken a 
$750 security deposit from the Hunters, but had never sent them a 
receipt telling them that the funds were deposited into a separate, inter-
est-bearing account free from the claims of LeBlanc's creditors. liS 
Christopher also learned that, while the tenants had received a properly 
drafted Notice to QUit,116 the Constable had left the notice under the 
115. In Massachusetts, a landlord who accepts a security deposit must deposit the funds in 
an interest-bearing account, free from claims of creditors of the landlord, and must notifY the 
tenant of the location of that account. Penalties for violation of these obligations include man-
datory treble damages (return of the deposit along with double damages). MASS. GEN. L. ch. 
186, § 158 (1994). 
116. As in most jurisdictions, a landlord in Massachusetts must terminate a tenancy by 
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door of the apartment across the hall, where their friend lived. Cathy 
had received the notice on the same day it was delivered, but she had 
received it from her friend, not from the Constable. 
Cathy's goal was to avoid eviction for as long as possible. It was 
March and still cold in New England. Her youngest child was ten 
months old and was often sick. It would take the Hunters several 
months to find a new apartment, especially with the need for the first 
month's rent, last month's rent, and security deposit (which together 
could easily total $2,250) most new landlords would demand. She was 
desperately fearful of being homeless. Her family was in Ireland, so 
she had no chance of staying with them if she was evicted. Her hus-
band had some relatives living nearby, but he was not on very good 
terms with them, so living with his side of the family was also out of 
the question. 
Christopher was quite moved by his interaction with Cathy, who 
seemed to be the victim of so much bad luck. Her landlord sounded 
like a mercenary who ran roughshod over his tenants' rights. Christo-
pher liked Cathy a lot, and her children were well-behaved and gentle, 
not what he was expecting in a family in such apparent distress. After 
the interview, he met with his faculty supervisor, Linda, to plan his 
strategy. After completing the research to which Linda directed him, 
Christopher developed an impressive strategy. He learned that the entire 
action against the Hunters could be dismissed because the Notice to 
Quit had not been served in the manner required by statute.1I7 If 
LeBlanc started over again after the dismissal, or if the dismissal mo-
tion was denied,1I8 Christopher discovered that he could win Cathy's 
means of a written notice properly served upon the tenants before beginning an eviction case 
in court. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 186, § 12 (1994). 
117. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 186. § 12 (1994). 
118. There was, Christopher realized, some substantial reason to forego a Motion to Dismiss 
and instead to save the faulty notice claim for trial. The Motion would be heard before the 
trial date if pled as such; the dismissal would then come sooner, rather than later. A motion to 
dismiss at trial would take advantage of the discovery delays and get the tenants a couple of 
weeks of delay longer. In Christopher'S thinking about this consideration, he was advised to 
look at DR 7-102(A)(1) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (in effect in his 
state), which reads as follows: 
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: 
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense. delay a trial, or take other 
action on behalf of his client when he knows or it is obvious that such action 
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another. 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSlBlLllY DR7-102(A)(1) (1981) (emphasis added). 
Christopher's review of this provision did not persuade him that using the timing of the 
motion to leverage two more weeks for Cathy and her family would violate it, for he was not 
doing what he did to harass or maliciously injure LeBlanc. His only goal was to save his 
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case on the merits, for LeBlanc had not complied with several of his 
obligations. Christopher easily and reasonably could assert the following 
counterclaims: (1) violation of the security deposit statute, with a treble 
damages penalty ($2,250) and attorney's fees,119 (2) interference with 
quiet enjoyment (the unauthorized entries), which allows a statutory 
three months' rent penalty and attorney's fees,120 (3) breach of the 
implied warranty of habitability by maintaining an unsafe and unsani-
tary dwelling,121 (4) violation of the state's Consumer Protection Act 
by renting a dwelling that was not in compliance with state law, with 
possible treble damages and attorney's fees,122 and (5) retaliatory evic-
tion, if one saw LeBlanc's action as evicting the Hunters for their 
lawful refusal to pay rent for a less than habitable dwelling, with three 
months' rent as a statutory penalty along with attorney's fees.123 
Christopher learned that Massachusetts has a statute which declares 
that if a tenant prevails on any counterclaim, she can retain possession 
of the rental unit. 124 While nervous about his ability to pull it off, 
Christopher was delighted that he could find a way to help this family 
so much. Indeed, he could demand as much as $20,250 in damages, if 
all of the treble damages and statutory penalties of the counterclaims 
were aggregated. 125 Linda warned Christopher about the conservative 
nature of all district court judges,126 in an effort to reality-test his 
judgments about what this case might be worth, but Christopher also 
knew that tenants in Massachusetts had an absolute right to appeal any 
judgment of the trial court, and have an entire trial de novo in superior 
vulnerable clients from homelessness. A review of the comparable Model Rules did not alter 
that conclusion. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 (1983) ("A lawyer 
shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client") 
(emphasis added). The interests of Cathy were to gain as much time as possible. 
119. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 186, § 15B (1994). 
120. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 186, § 14 (1994). 
121. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); McKenna v. 
Begin, 325 N.E.2d 587 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 239, § 8A (1994). 
122. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 93A, § 9 (1994). 
123. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 239, § 2A (1994); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 186, § 18 (1994). 
124. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 239, § SA (1994). If she owes money to the landlord after her 
successful counterclaim is offset against any rent due, the tenant must pay the difference within 
seven days if she wants to maintain possession. If the landlord owes the tenant money after 
offsetting counterclaims and rent claims, the tenant merely keeps possession. [d. 
125. Christopher did the math in the following way: Security deposit ($2250); quiet enjoy-
ment ($2250); retaliation ($2250); habitability claim (50% of all rent owed or paid since in-
ception of tenancy, for a total of $4500); consumer protection act treble damages ($4500 hab-
itability damages times two additional, for a total of $9000). These figures do not include 
possible attorney's fees. 
126. See Bezdek, supra note 105, at 539 (providing examples of judges in Baltimore). 
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COurt,127 where he understood that the judges were likely to be less 
jaded and more comfortable with figures like $20,500. 
This appeal, in fact, was Christopher's ace in the hole. If Linda 
was right that local district court judges were not favorably inclined 
toward tenants, all that meant was that Cathy would have a legitimate 
right to appeal the case. While the appeal was of right, and could take 
up to a year to complete,128 Cathy would stilI be required to pay the 
fair market rent during that period, which could be a real problem if 
what she was looking for was free time (recall that as of now she 
could not pay the rent of $750 while on AFDC, and her income was 
not likely to increase in the reasonable future). 
However, Christopher was not without ideas about how to get 
around this serious problem. How much rent Cathy and her family 
would be required to pay during the appeal was a function of the con-
dition of the apartment, and likely to be in dispute. The district court 
judges tended to use the contract rent as the chosen figure. But that 
decision was itself appealablel29 to the Superior Court, and perhaps 
even beyond that. Until there was a definitive ruling on the question of 
appropriate rent, Christopher might be able to get Cathy the ability to 
stay in the apartment rent free. While there were certainly limits on 
Christopher's ability to manipulate these procedural devices,130 he was 
comfortable in his prediction that Cathy could live in her apartment at 
least for the next few months without paying any rent131 and without 
127. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 239, § 5 (1994). 
128. The "appeal" consists of a new trial in Superior Court. See Kargman v. Superior 
Court, 357 N.E.2d 300 (Mass. 1976). Once assigned to that court the summary process matter 
is entitled to priority on the "accelerated" list, see Standing Orders of the Superior Court, 
Standing Order 1-88, in MASSACHUSEITS RULES OF COURT 931, 934 (1995), which calls for 
assignment for hearing or trial within 180 days of filing. /d. at 933. The experience of prac-
ticing lawyers in the larger counties of Massachusetts, however, is that completion of the entire 
new trial proceeding in less than a year is unlikely, with the delays at the front end of the 
appeal, the congestion of the trial calendars, and the post-trial proceedings. 
129. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 239, § 5 (1994). 
130. The most significant potential limitation that Christopher faced in implementing this 
plan was the chance that judges and clerks would not follow the law as written. The plan 
described by Christopher followed state statutes and court rules carefully and literally, and as-
sumed that judicial officials would do the same. Not all officials are so faithful to the law-in-
the-books, and relief from or review of any inappropriate decisions is not always available, if 
the appellate-level officials also do not follow the rules. To legal theorists (and to law students 
exposed to the courts for the first time), this lawlessness may seem implausible or even shock-
ing. To the legal realist practitioners, however, it is a not-uncommon occurrence. 
131. Christopher understood that Cathy would owe money to the landlord for each month in 
which she lived in the apartment (depending on the amount offset by her counterclaims), but 
Christopher also understood that given Cathy's future financial prospects and current welfare 
status she was essentially "judgment-proof." Any judgment that LeBlanc might get against her 
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any fear of eviction. 
There was, finally, one last real-world advantage to the Hunters 
that Christopher's research unearthed. Whenever LeBlanc obtained his 
eviction order from a court, whether sooner from the District Court, 
later from the Superior Court, or through some negotiated agreement, 
LeBlanc would have to finance the dispossession of the tenants from 
his unit. The cost of moving, and perhaps even packing, the tenants' 
belongings, and storing them for several months must be borne by the 
landlord,132 although the landlord does have a right, in theory, to seek 
recompense from the tenants through a separate civil action.133 While 
this fact had some relevance to the plans of the Hunters, who knew 
that if they must move they would not forfeit their property, its great-
est strength was in the negotiating leverage it offered Christopher with 
the landlord, whose costs even after a successful eviction could ap-
proach $2,000. 
Emboldened by his research results, Christopher called Cathy to 
tell her his belief that she had a pretty compelling case, and that the 
clinic would accept the matter for representation. Christopher wished to 
discuss the various options with Cathy and with Patrick before filing 
either his Motion to Dismiss or his Answer and Counterclaims. Christo-
pher arranged to visit the Hunters at their apartment the next evening. 
That visit to the apartment was one of two back-to-back events 
that caused Christopher to begin to have serious personal discomfort 
with his role in what otherwise was a model piece of clinic litiga-
tion.134 The meeting was quite disenchanting to Christopher. The 
apartment that he had imagined as a tribute to slumlordism turned out 
to be quite nice. It was nicer, in fact, than the place he shared with his 
law school roommates. This did not mean that Cathy's claims were not 
would survive for many years, but the likelihood of her actually paying even a small part of it 
was extremely slight. Therefore, any financial advantages that Christopher might leverage for 
her in the form of rent-free living or storage funded by the landlord translated into actual 
income for the Hunters. 
132. See G. WARSHAW, MASSACHUSElTS LANDLORD-TENANT LAW §§ 8:8, 8:9, at 253-57 
(1987). 
133. But, of course, the tenants are unlikely ever to have to pay if they are judgment-
proof. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
134. Gary Bellow, among others, has observed that legal services lawyers all too frequently 
provide minimalist, slipshod, incomplete representation to their clients, and not the zealous, in-
depth representation that Christopher anticipated here. See Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions Into 
Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, NLADA BRIEFCASE, Aug. 1977, at 106. Whatever the 
strength of that empirical observation, clinical students working in legal services settings are 
less likely to feel the pressures (that full time legal aid lawyers experience) to provide shallow 
services. 
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true, for nice apartments could have mice and infrequent hot water, 
etc., but Christopher began to have doubts about Cathy's perspective on 
things. These doubts were more than encouraged by his reaction to 
Patrick, whom Christopher perceived as angry, manipulative, and less 
than honest. In talking to Patrick that evening Christopher just could 
not get Patrick's story to feel right, even though Patrick never altered 
the tale Cathy had first recounted. Proof of their story was weak or 
implausible or, at times, nonexistent. The Hunters had no receipts for 
the rent they claimed LeBlanc had failed to credit them. They had 
called the local Health Department on three separate occasions over the 
past year complaining about substandard conditions, but on each occa-
sion the Health Department had found no violations at all, or only 
minor ones like chipped tiles in the bathroom. Patrick told Christopher 
that LeBlanc had the health inspectors "in his pocket," so the Hunters 
could never get a fair visit from them. 
Patrick was very excited by what Christopher had told Cathy on 
the telephone about the case being strong. He had been in touch with 
the city's tenants' union, and he pressed Christopher about the counter-
claims and the various treble damages awards that the Hunters might 
get. He knew about the appeal process and wanted to think through 
with Christopher just how long they could stay in the apartment 
without paying any rent. He hoped that they could play out the process 
long enough for Patrick's disability claim to be heard. If they had to 
leave earlier, they might be able to move in with Patrick's parents in 
their house in the next town. While there was room there, Patrick saw 
that as an absolute last alternative because his parents disapproved of 
some of Patrick's friends and would, as he described it, "always be on 
my case." 
Christopher, with Linda assisting from time to time, explained to 
the Hunters his various theories, although neither mentioned the 
$20,500 figure. 13s He agreed to think through with Linda the various 
ways to proceed, although Patrick expressed a preference for holding 
back the Motion to Dismiss to try for the greatest delay.136 
Soon after this meeting, a second sobering event occurred. With 
135. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. Christopher and Linda discussed afterwards 
whether that omission was justifiable. Both agreed that the inherent unlikelihood of the Hunters 
ever seeing such an award, combined with their shared skepticism about the strength of the 
claims' merits after talking to Patrick, served as such a justification. But, each also admitted 
that the line between principled decision making and rationalization about that strategic choice 
was a fine one. 
136. See supra note 118. 
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Linda's blessing,137 Christopher called LeBlanc's lawyer, Jeannette 
Sinclair, ostensibly to begin negotiations and perhaps to learn some-
thing about LeBlanc's theory that might aid in Christopher's strategy. 
The conversation with Jeannette was extraordinarily depressing for 
Christopher. Jeannette was nice to Christopher, and seemed a princi-
pled, smart, and collaborative lawyer (to the extent that one can discern 
this from a single call\3S). She also painted a picture of LeBlanc, and 
of the Hunters, that was very different from what Christopher had cre-
ated for himself. LeBlanc was a married man with three children, 
working at a nearby computer company, who had purchased this three 
unit building as an investment. His mortgage payments on the building 
were a bit less than the income from the three units, and the Hunters' 
refusal to pay him was causing him not only severe financial distress, 
but serious personal health concerns as well. Jeannette painted the 
Hunters as unfortunate victims (neither party had planned on Patrick 
losing his job) who had turned on LeBlanc with a vengeance. They 
called his home repeatedly and harassed both LeBlanc and his wife, 
they called the Health Department again and again hoping to find a 
way to avoid liability for the back rent, and they kept threatening to 
bring claims against LeBlanc if he tried to evict them. 
Christopher was at a loss about how to proceed in this telephone 
conversation. He did not (and felt he could not) disparage LeBlanc in 
return, but he did opt to layout his legal claims in an effort to show 
Jeannette that the Hunters had grounds on which to stand. She respond-
ed to each. On the security deposit claim she possessed records show-
ing that the deposit had been placed in the correct kind of bank ac-
count and that a receipt had been mailed to the Hunters; however, she 
now noticed, that receipt, like the notice to quit, seemed to have been 
sent to Apartment B, not the Hunters' Apartment A. Because the resi-
dent of Apartment B was the Hunters' friend, she did not view that 
misstep as of any substantive concern. She denied all of the other 
claims. 139 She did not wish to be unreasonable, though, and wanted to 
137. Linda was a nondirective supervisor; Christopher did not as a rule get an "OK" from 
her before he acted. Still, he used her as a sounding board for his decisions, and he knew 
when she was approving of what he planned. See James H. Stark et aI., Directiveness in Clini-
cal Supervision, 3 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 35 (1993). 
13S. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note lOS, at 539-40 (describing the plausible, if unlike-
ly, tactic by which a gladiator will mimic a collaborator to sucker the opponent to cooperate 
and thus become vulnerable). 
139. Regarding the habitability claims, she pointed to the Health Department records 
clearing her client, and also reported that LeBlanc had responded immediately to each com-
plaint by the Hunters. He put down mouse traps but never found a mouse. The hot water 
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talk about a possible compromise. She offered to allow the Hunters 
three weeks to move. If they moved without LeBlanc's resort to the 
expensive constable, mover, and storage arrangement, LeBlanc would 
forgive all of the back rent. Christopher agreed only to discuss the 
offer with his clients. 
With Linda present, Christopher met with Patrick and Cathy at the 
clinic office. The meeting did not go well. Patrick sensed Christopher's 
sympathies for LeBlanc and accused him of not siding with his own 
clients. Patrick said that Jeannette Sinclair was a liar and a slumlord 
lawyer who should not be believed. The documents to which she had 
referred in the telephone call, and which she had now fa'{ed to Christo-
pher for his review, were, Patrick pointed out, either irrelevant (the 
Health Department papers did not expressly rule out mice) or supported 
their claim (the security deposit papers were sent to the wrong ad-
dress). Patrick did not see anything different between the last meeting 
and now; all of the counterclaims could still be filed, and all of the 
delays and procedural steps were still available. He wished to proceed 
as before. He could not afford to move in three weeks, so he needed 
to use the court for as much time as he could get. Cathy quietly 
agreed. 140 
After the meeting, even though it was late, Christopher and Linda 
moved into her office to think all this through . 
I wish to end my story at this point. 141 We leave Christopher 
heater had malfunctioned for two days, but LeBlanc repaired that as soon as his plumber could 
get the part. LeBlanc did enter the apartment on two occasions with his key to respond to 
complaints left by the Hunters. On both occasions nobody answered his knock. Once nobody 
was home; the other time the Hunters were asleep, under the covers, in the fold-out couch. 
Seeing that LeBlanc apologized and left immediately. Finally, she had LeBlanc's rent books, 
and they showed that the Hunters indeed received credit for the free month's rent offered by 
the original bank representative; their rental history since was one of broken promises, partial 
payments, and bounced checks. 
140. It is important for readers to understand that the description of procedural advantages 
available to tenants in court in Massachusetts, while literally accurate, does not represent the 
practice within courts in that state. All of the available evidence indicates that landlords evict 
tenants swiftly and effortlessly in Massachusetts. A recent survey showed that of 375 summary 
process cases tracked, 75% of cases reached final judgment within 20 days of entry, landlords 
were awarded possession in 80% of the cases, and only 2.4% of all cases were appealed. 
Mass. Law Reform Institute, Unpublished Study (1995) (on file with author). See also Bezdek, 
supra note 105, at 553-57 (similar findings within Baltimore's courts). 
141. Despite my career-long work with tenants in distress, I have intended in this story to 
portray tenants of questionable integrity. Unlike a recent story told by Homer La Rue, my 
story presents tenants whose motives are mixed and whose character is at least subject to ques-
tion. Compare La Rue, supra note \OS, at 1153 (describing representation of a very honorable 
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and Linda in a state of some moral ambiguity. 142 The conversation 
they are about to begin may be informed by the notions of morally 
activist lawyering Linda might have tried to teach in the clinic, or that 
Christopher might have encountered in his professional responsibility 
course. Let us assume that each has read the central Simon and Luban 
works, Linda perhaps more closely than Christopher. Their conversa-
tion, and its various possibilities, is explored in the following Part. 
IV. WORKING WITHIN AN ACTIVIST CONCEPTION 
A. THE TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVE CONTRASTED 
If Christopher had never heard of David Luban, Richard 
Wasserstrom, or William Simon, or (put another way) if he had gone 
to law school in the mid-1970s, his assessment of this case might be 
straightforward, if painful. Without an activist view Christopher suc-
cumbs to the "arguably legal," nonaccountable, standard conception. His 
professional role demands that, while acting as the Hunters' lawyer, he 
represent them zealously within the bounds of the law. As long as he 
remains within those bounds, he has done nothing improper. If some-
one, whether Jeannette Sinclair, Carl LeBlanc, the local judge, a curi-
ous reporter, or a friend, should press Christopher about how he can do 
what he is doing for these tenants, he has an answer: "It's my job. 
Because everything I do here is legal, I must do it if my clients ask. I 
don't judge them, but you may." His clients will feel defended and 
supported, and Christopher would perhaps get high marks within his 
clinical program for clever and ambitious case planning and advocacy. 
tenant). Not only do I encounter such individuals on occasion in my practice, but the questions 
about their character are essential to the moral struggle Christopher has experienced. 
142. The only possible argument that there is no moral ambiguity in this stOI)' would come 
from the left. I need to explain why that is so. An argument against ambiguity from the right 
would have to say that these tenants could not possibly have moral claims against this land-
lord, an argument which if accepted leaves the activist lawyer in a real role conflict (for part 
of her role says "defend zealously," but her unambiguous moral self says "don't touch this 
case"). So, from that perspective there is a professional moral dilemma even if the moral as-
sessment of the tenants' actions is unambiguous. The argument from the left would say that 
the tenants cannot possibly be blamed for their actions, given historical and structural forces 
that require powerless and vulnerable persons like the Hunters to play these kinds of games 
merely to maintain a roof over their heads. Accepting that view takes away any mor-
al/professional tension, for the traditional and the activist agendas join forces, and the lawyer 
suffers no role uncertainty. I think the argument from the left is a powerful one, but I cannot 
acknowledge that it is an unambiguous one, especially among practicing lawyers and law stu-
dents. This inherent slipperiness about moral content captures an important point about some 
parts of the activist regime: they rely on the good faith moral judgments of folks who will 
disagree frequently. 
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In this way, the traditional view is straightforward. This stance 
also will tend to aid poor clients of the clinic more than an activist 
view would,143 at least identified, individual clients.144 But it is pain-
ful, and may be morally corrupt. The conversation between Christopher 
and Linda in her office cannot proceed very far if both adhere to the 
standard conception. That conception permits two responses to moral 
ambiguity or tension, withdrawal or moral conversation, but it is im-
portant to recognize that each of these responses is discouraged by the 
standard conception because of its nonaccountability component.145 
Withdrawal as a response to moral tension will be difficult. 146 Espe-
143. While my reading of some of the activist proposals below shows that one might read 
them as permitting full advocacy here, see infra notes 62-97 and accompanying text, my point 
remains that with activism one might or might not follow one's clients' instructions in a case 
like ours, but with traditionalism one always follows those wishes. Homer La Rue, although 
not arguing for the traditional view of lawyering, shows how zeal for one's client might create 
an empathy that a more judgmental perspective would discourage. See La Rue, supra note \OS, 
at 1155 ("The student noticed how his own desire to 'win' pushed him to identilY with his 
client in a way that permitted him to experience, if only for a moment, the powerlessness of a 
person who lives her life in a state of subordination.") 
144. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the way in which 
an activist conception might be justified on the basis of the benefits it offers to a client com-
munity, or to poor constituents more generally. 
145. Defenders of the standard conception argue that it incorporates moral sensitivity in its 
encouragement of lawyer discussion of nonlegal considerations and in its permissive withdrawal 
options. See Stier, supra note 39, at 596-98; Pepper, Amoral Role. supra note 36, at 630-33. 
But neither of these characteristics of the standard conception survives well the 
non accountability principle. As the discussion in the text shows, both measures presuppose some 
moral dissonance within the lawyer; if she is trained by the non accountability lesson not to 
perceive moral dissonance, her need to engage in the (frequently) painful process of moral 
dialogue or abandonment is considerably lessened. 
146. See Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice, supra note 22, at 122 (discussing withdrawal as a 
remedy for discomfort). 
Depending upon the jurisdiction, Christopher may be permitted to cease representation of 
the Hunters even under the standard conception. The Model Code, which applies in his state, 
permits withdrawal if his client "renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out 
his employment effectively." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILlIT DR 2-
110(C)(\)(d) (1981). The Model Code also permits withdrawal where the client "insists ... 
that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer 
but not prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules." /d. at DR 2-110(C)(I)(e). This seems to fit 
Christopher's quandary perfectly, but that discretion exists only "in a matter not pending before 
a tribunal." Id This limitation implies that in litigation a lawyer may not abandon individuals 
who insist upon conduct contrary to the lawyer's judgment. 
The Model Rules generally offer greater freedom for lawyers to withdraw from represen-
tation, but a close reading of Model Rule 1.16 leaves some question about whether Christopher 
could withdraw here. Rule 1.16(b) permits withdrawal either "if withdrawal can be accom-
plished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client" (which cannot be satisfied 
here), or if "(3) the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repug-
nant or imprudent." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b) (1983). Whether 
this applies turns on one's read of the term "objective." The Hunters' primary objective is to 
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cially in the legal services context, the option is such a drastic one that 
it ought to be quite rare. 147 It is also harder to justify withdrawal un-
der a traditional regime. Consider the perspective of the advocate for 
tenants: "Why abandon tenants with good legal claims when your pro-
fession allows you to represent them without moral sanction?" There 
are answers to that challenge, but my point is that the answers flow 
less easily in a regime committed to the standard conception. 
Even as dedicated traditionalists, Christopher and Linda may also 
consider the role of moral dialogue with the Hunters.148 As noted ear-
lier,149 the professed amorality of the advocate role makes this process 
less plausible than it would be within an activist realm. Still, there are 
few principled (as opposed to comfort-related) reasons to dismiss this 
suggestion. One might argue that in the case of the Hunters, facing 
homelessness and convinced that their landlord has violated their rights, 
such deliberation is apt to be unproductive, but there are important 
reasons not to treat it so dismissively.150 If that process fails to alter 
avoid homelessness, which 1 take not to be imprudent even to Christopher; but their more 
focused objective (reading the facts most unfavorably) is to manipulate the procedural rules to 
force the landlord to subsidize their housing for as many months as possible, which 1 shall 
assume is repugnant to Christopher. 
147. The clinic in which Christopher works is the "last lawyer in town" for eligible per-
sons, unless they can afford to hire counsel out of the private market, which of course is 
never likely. Refusing to continue with the case, even if permitted under the Model Code, 
would amount to a denial of the "right" of the Hunters to assert their claims and defenses, 
and would lead directly to a quicker eviction. 
148. Moral dialogue is of course permitted under existing norms. See Margulies, Interests of 
Nonclients, supra note 25, at 223-27. Standard conception defenders rely on that measure to 
supply the moral element to adversary system practice. See Pepper, Amoral Role, supra note 
36, at 630-32; Stier, supra note 39, at 596; cf Griffin, supra note I, at 228. See also Loder, 
supra note 52 (proposing dialogue as a means to reincorporate moral considerations into law-
yering); Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1759, 1759 
(1993) (deliberation with clients about ends and means is the most important virtue lawyers can 
possess). But see Monroe H. Freedman, Ethical Ends and Ethical Means, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
55, 57 (1991) (disagreeing from the traditionalist perspective with William Simon's version of 
moral dialogue with clients); Lee Modjeska. On Teaching Morality to Law Students, 41 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 71, 72 (1991) (disagreeing from a traditionalist perspective with any suggestion 
of moral dialogue with clients); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
147-48 (1978) (discouraging "incorporating morals or policy into [a lawyer's] advice"). 
149. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
150. One obvious potential benefit of such deliberation is the prospect that the lawyers' 
beliefs about the moral quality of the Hunters' tactics might change. See Gutmann, supra note 
148, at 1764 (lawyers have no comparative advantage over "other thoughtful people" about so-
cial justice); Margulies, Civic Republican View, supra note 60, at 702-03 (client narratives' 
possibility to effect changes in student attitudes); David B. Wilkins, Practical Wisdom for Prac-
ticing Lawyers: Separating Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 458, 471 
(1994); LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 174. Even if the lawyers' conceptions 
of the moral fabric of the case is not changed by the dialogue. there is some potential that the 
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the moral landscape in any significant way, however, under the stan-
dard conception the lawyer's only option will be to proceed. 
B. THE ACTIVIST PERSPECTIVES 
1. "Opting In" as an Activist 
My argument in the last section has been that a traditionalist, a 
neutral partisan, will perceive his obligation to be to defend the Hunt-
ers with all "arguably legal" means. I have constructed the case in such 
a way that all of Christopher's original tactics remain "arguably le-
gal,"ISI but are morally troublesome. The standard conception has 
little place, though, for Christopher's moral concerns. The emerging 
morally activist lawyering conception, however, purports to offer just 
such a place. As it is no longer the 1970s, Christopher and Linda have 
available to them a melange of ideas from the productive philosophers, 
all suggesting that the tension between Christopher's professional role 
demands and his personal integrity ought to be addressed in a way in 
which the integrity element is not so easily sacrificed. 
Let us assume that Christopher and Linda know about the emerg-
ing literature. Christopher has read, as part of his clinical course, ex-
cerpts from works by Wasserstrom, Simon, and Luban, and opposing 
views by Pepper and Fried; Linda has read a bit more, including some 
of the essays from The Good Lawyer and Rob Atkinson's comprehen-
sive critique of this movement. Let us also assume that each feels 
some moral difficulty with the Hunters' case as it has developed. It is 
at this moment that the first of the "expertise" questions arises for this 
student and his supervisor. 
Because their world is more rich, and more multifaceted, than it 
would have been in, say, 1974, they have available what might be con-
sidered choices about how to orient their professional lives at this mo-
ment. But the choices are controversial and the subject of expert dis-
clients will be open to reconsideration of their tactics if their safety and shelter needs can be 
met through some creative problem solving. See, e.g., Shaffer, Moral Discourse, supra note 27, 
at 244-45 (lawyers frequently underestimate clients' concern for fairness). 
151. I believe that position is defensible. None of Patrick's claims or Christopher's early 
tactical ideas are conclusively ruled out by Jeannette Sinclair's responses. The landlord has 
made certain technical errors in his processing of the relevant documents; discovery is a per-
fectly legal method of ascertaining whether what Jeannette has said is true and has adequate 
evidentiary support; and, some factual questions are likely to remain after trial that could war-
rant an appeal. 
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agreement. Some very articulate and thoughtful philosophers argue that 
a neutral partisan attitude at this moment is a morally superior stance; 
other equally articulate and thoughtful philosophers, marshaling differ-
ent strands of moral philosophy, disagree, arguing that the neutral parti-
san stance sanctions a good deal of immoral behavior. And, among 
those latter adherents, some favor a certain model of "activism," while 
others support differing models. Indeed, the more that Linda and Chris-
topher know about these choices, the less clear it becomes how to 
decide among them, if in fact "choosing" is the apt label for this pro-
cess. 
I think it should become clear that "choosing" in fact is not the 
most apt description of Christopher's experience as he reacts to the 
Hunter tension. For the moment, though, I want to maintain that meta-
phor. If we could break down his moral thought process at this junc-
ture, there appears to be two parts to this moral calculus. First, does he 
opt for a traditional stance, or an activist one? If I am correct that 
there are differences between these two universes, then it is not illogi-
cal to think of lawyers as falling into one "camp" or the other. 152 If 
Christopher is a traditionalist, and if my assessment of the standard 
conception is reliable, then he proceeds as I described above, which 
means essentially litigating this "arguably legal" defense. If he is not a 
traditionalist, but instead is an activist, then his second decision point 
arises: which of the activist arguments does he accept, and which does 
he reject? If I am correct that there are cognizable differences among 
the activists, then it is not illogical to expect that those differences will 
affect the practice experience (or, equally relevantly, the moral assess-
ment) of the resulting lawyering. 
Two things seem to be true at this point in the argument. One is 
that Christopher most likely will not perform (and will not have done 
so in the recent past) a philosophical investigation and analysis of the 
competing theories, judging then one to be superior, before acting. The 
152. While most moral philosophers identifY as members of the teleological or the 
deontological schools, see, e.g., FRANKENA, supra note 9, at 14-17 (describing adherents from 
each side), one frequently finds, in contemporary ethics literature, writers borrowing from both 
theories. See, e.g., VIRGINIA HEI.D, RIGHTS AND GOODS I I 1-12 (1984) (proposing teleological 
reasoning for politics and deontological for law); Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 
20, at 425-43 (employing both kinds of reasoning in his assessment of the adversary system's 
justification); ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY 
OF MORAL REASONING 300-02 (1988) (describing the overlap between the two theories); TOM 
L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 55, 100-01 (4th 
ed. 1994) (describing ethical decision making models that borrow from several philosophical 
theories). 
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second is that Christopher will act in some way on this case, a way 
which in hindsight will be describable as consonant with one or anoth-
er of the philosophical theories. That is to say, he cannot (unless he is 
a rare law student) resolve the philosophers' debates, but he will have 
to act as though he has done so, at least provisionally and at least for 
his conception of his career at this moment. These observations are apt 
to apply to both of the two hypothesized decision points that I have 
described: whether to be an activist, and (if chosen) what kind of activ-
ist to be. But, as I alluded to above, it is unfair to refer to these as 
choices, for that may accord an overstated sense of deliberative judg-
ment to this process. It is more likely that Christopher will search in 
some imperfect, "satisficing»1S3 way to reconcile his moral beliefs, his 
legal obligations, and his personal reactions to his clients and' their 
case. What looks like a series of decision points might instead be a 
complex blend of tactical and ethical sentiments. 
If my description is accurate, then the philosophers' richly tex-
tured arguments are nearly beside the point for Christopher's proceed-
ing on this case, except as follows. The arguments, whether richly 
textured or not, are critically important in affording an intellectually 
pedigreed justification for the initial orientation that Christopher will 
already hope to follow. It ought to be easier to be morally activist in 
1995 than in 1974, thanks to Luban, Simon, Wasserstrom, etc. In addi-
tion, the arguments, and here preferably richly textured ones, will aid 
Christopher in his post hoc defense for what he opts to do within his 
morally ambiguous professional experience. Differing activist concep-
tions can justify different lawyering postures, and my best guess is that, 
once the abandonment of the standard conception is accomplished, the 
differences among the activist experts are more valuable after the fact 
than as principled direction ex ante for one posture among several 
choices. 
153. "Satisficing" is a term capturing an attempt to do one's best amid pressures and cir-
cumstances that do not allow for perfect processing of information. The term is attributed to 
Herbert Simon. See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxviii-xxxi, at 38-41 
(1976); see also HERBERT A. SIMON, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 
AM. ECON. REV. 493, 502-03 (1979); Brook K. Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role of Con-
text, Experience, Theory and Reflection in Ecological Learning, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 287, 332 
(1994). 
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2. Within the Activist World: The Three Models Applied 
Earlier I described the three most prominent available activist 
"models": Luban's morality-driven stance, Simon's "purposivist" model, 
and Simon's 'justice"-based conception. ls4 While I have just argued 
that the link. between the philosophical arguments separating the activist 
models and one's choice of a model as a practicing lawyer is at best 
tentative, it is important to proceed to compare some of the practice 
implications for each model. Whether I am right or not about how one 
comes to be (even for a moment) a "Simonist" or a "Lubanite," the 
differing models are prominently out there, and how they might be ap-
plied is of some importance to those who wish to understand and to 
refine the activist endeavor. Let us, then, apply these activist ideas to 
Christopher's current predicament. 
a) Luban's Morality-Driven Thesis 
Consider first Luban's stance, tied as it is to a conception of 
ordinary morality. Luban suggests a rather concrete deliberative method 
that lawyers might use when confronting role conflict. 155 He offers 
the following seven-step method he claims lawyers can apply to assess 
the justifiability of any morally troubling action: 
1. Identifying the institution, the role, the role obligation and the 
role_act. 
2. Assessing the institution, role, and role obligation in the light of 
the ends they are to serve. 
3. Applying the minimum-threshold test: determining whether, at 
each link, the credits and debits indicate that the entity (institution, 
role, role obligation, role act) is justified. 
4. Applying the cumulative-weight test: determining the total sig-
nificance of the various policy arguments to the role act. 
S. Assessing the relevance of the policy arguments to the case at 
hand. 
6. Resolving the dilemma by weighing the justification of the role 
act against the moral offense of performing it. 
7. Acting: s6 
154. See supra notes 73-97. 
ISS. See LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 139-40. 
156. [d. at 140. Luban rejects the expected objection that this deliberative process "seems 
like a lot to ask" for lawyers. especially in routine, unexciting matters such as "'a lousy four-
bill landlord-tenant case.''' ld. His response, that "[ w ]hat looks to be hopelessly complex is not 
so bad in real life," stresses that this deliberative process need not be repeated in full each 
time a lawyer confronts a moral controversy; for this lawyer. once she has thought through the 
implications of the role justification in some depth, "[t]he only deliberative acts that must be 
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The seven-step process measures the competing justifications of the 
institution that asks for role-adherence and the demands of ordinary 
morality. Five steps judge the strength of the commitment to which the 
institution is entitled, one step compares the institutional justifications 
to the moral offense at hand, and the seventh step is the decision 
point: "acting." But Luban's analysis is only useful, of course, if one 
can determine ex ante that the lawyer in question is asked to perform a 
"moral offense." That question is not addressed by Luban, except 
obliquely.ls7 His oblique answer is, essentially, that we ought to know 
moral difficulty when we see it. 
Returning to our student and supervisor, Christopher does see 
moral conflict here. He believes strongly that Luban's ex ante re-
quirement is met, and in his conversation with Linda he is ready to 
apply the seven-step test. Christopher's assessment concludes that he 
ought not advocate zealously for these clients. Relying on Luban's 
persuasive arguments,IS8 Christopher finds only weak justifications for 
his institutional role obligations. The moral harm to LeBlanc, by con-
trast, is substantial. On balance, this looks like the time for activism. 
Christopher is not clear, exactly, what activism will mean in this case, 
but he is confident that he ought not employ the usual, standard law-
yering tactics here, even though his clients want it (and would benefit 
by it). 
Linda shares Christopher's uncertainty about what activism might 
mean in this case, but she has a more fundamental question about 
whether the case fits the activism conception at all. She wants to know 
more about Christopher's reactions to the case. Why, she inquires, does 
Christopher feel so strongly that he is being asked to commit a "moral 
offense"? Christopher is articulate about that: he has been raised in a 
household (indeed, in a culture) which values self-reliance and respon-
sibility. Christopher does not believe that Patrick has any moral right, 
even if one could squeeze out a legal right, to live off the sweat of 
Carl LeBlanc, which is the effect of prolonging the Hunters' tenancy. 
Christopher recalls from his ethics textbook a compelling argument 
from Kant that one should never use another person merely as a means 
perfonned on the spot are those needed to bring these rather abstract assessments to bear on 
the dilemma at hand." Id. at 141. 
157. See Luban, Partisanship. Autonomy and Betrayal, supra note 22, at 1023-25 (respond-
ing to Ellmann's complaint that moral questions are relative by insisting that most of us recog-
nize basic moral truths). 
158. See LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 116-19; Luban, Adversary System 
Excuse, supra note 41, at 93-117. 
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to an end. ls9 That is what he sees going on here. Furthermore, 
Patrick's anger, his apparent dishonesty, and his manipulativeness all 
support the strong reaction that Christopher is being asked to help a 
malingerer and to serve as an "enabler" to Patrick's efforts for hand-
outs. 
Linda finds this conversation heartening but incomplete. She is 
encouraged that Christopher is willing to acknowledge the moral com-
plexity of lawyer role; she sees too many lawyers practicing in law 
firms and elsewhere who unthinkingly subscribe to the amorality and 
nonaccountability traditionalists have so long taught. Studying Luban 
and Simon in the clinic might have made a difference in Christopher's 
outlook as a lawyer. But Linda is, at the same time, not entirely satis-
fied with Christopher's moral assessment of Patrick. Patrick annoys her, 
too, but she sees a bigger picture here, with a historical framework that 
helps her to understand why some families end up like the Hunters. 
Indeed, her resolution of the moral conflict might well be different 
from Christopher's. Are the Hunters angry? Yes, but anger is not an 
inappropriate reaction to feelings of helplessness and oppression. But 
are the Hunters really "oppressed"? This is much harder for Linda to 
sort out, but she knows that Patrick's inability to make ends meet 
through his blue-collar, unskilled employment is connected somehow to 
much larger economic forces, and that the family's welfare benefits are 
insufficient to allow them to live in private housing.160 She might 
agree with Christopher that Patrick is exaggerating his disability claim 
(although she is more willing than Christopher to suspend judg-
mentI61), yet she is open to see that as Patrick's effort to maintain 
159. Immanuel Kant, FOUNDATIONS OF TIlE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS AND WHAT IS EN-
LIGHTENMENT? 46 (Lewis W. Beck trans., 2d ed. 1990) quoted in RHODE, PERVASIVE METIlOD, 
supra note 24, at 24 n.40 (1994). 
160. It is well accepted within politically progressive circles that poverty is the result of a 
complex combination of political and economic structural forces. That view assigns less 
"blame" to the victims of poverty. For discussion of some of the literature in this vein, see 
Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 
16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659, 660 (1987-88); Joel Handler, The Transformation of 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457 (1987-88) [hereinafter Handler, Transformation of Aid]; 
Jack Katz, Caste. Class. and Counsel for the Poor, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 251 (1985); 
Peter Margulies, Representing Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law: 
Towards Access. Connection. and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996) (asserting 
the connection between poverty and gender); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their 
Immorality. Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. LJ. 1499 (1991); JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL 
HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA (1991); 
MICHAEL B. KATZ, POVERTY AND POLICY IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1983). 
16 J. For an elaborate discussion of the connection between poverty and disability, and the 
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some fonn of income for his family. Her view is that this family may 
be less "free," less "responsible," and less blameworthy than her stu-
dent perceives.162 
If her interpretation is right, Linda is still quite stuck about the 
moral balance involved in the choices surrounding whether to exploit 
court procedures. The Hunters' gain comes at LeBlanc's expense, and 
she does not share the Hunters' low opinion of LeBlanc. He seems to 
have been patient and reasonable, if not perfect, as a landlord. But 
LeBlanc's possible innocence does not end things for Linda. She wants 
to compare his financial sacrifice to the effect of homelessness on the 
Hunters. 163 She is able to articulate a way in which less harm would 
occur if the clinic went all out for these tenants, giving them some 
time to relocate even if this comes at the landlord's expense. Linda 
also can see a "rule-consequentialist" perspective here, which might 
favor zealous advocacy for tenants as a policy even if in some instanc-
es the balance of harms seems unfair. l64 
social construction of the latter, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients. Disabling Lawyers, 
43 HASTINGS LJ. 769 (1992). 
162. For a discussion of personal responsibility and poverty, see Ross, supra note 160, at 
1499 ("Poor people are different from us. Most of them are morally weak and undeserving. 
And, in any event, we are helpless to solve the complex and daunting problem of poverty. 
This is the rhetoric of poverty."); Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Mod-
ification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE LJ. 719 (1992); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE 
SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA at xi-xii (1986); 
Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiv-
ing and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 861, 883-88 (1992) (describing stories of 
the "worthy" poor and the interplay of state and economic forces in the creation of poverty); 
Handler, Transformation of Aid. supra note 160, at 468-69. 
163. For a discussion of the harms of homelessness, and the relationship between economic 
forces and shortage of housing, see, e.g., MICHAEL H. LANG, HOMELESSNESS AMID AFFLU-
ENCE: STRUCTIJRE AND PARADOX IN THE AMERICAN POLI11CAL ECONOMY 15-19 (1989); DOUG 
A. TIMMER, ET AL., PATHS TO HOMELESSNESS: EXTREME POVERTY AND THE URBAN HOUSING 
CRISIS 14-15, 18-30 (1994); Lucie E. White. Representing "The Real Deal", 45 U. MIAMI L. 
REv. 271, 281-91 (1990-91); Curtis J. Berger, Beyond Homelessness: An Entitlement to Hous-
ing, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 315, 317-24 (1990-91); Nancy Morawetz, Welfare Litigation to 
Preo.·ent Homelessness, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 565, 567 (1988-89) (developing the 
connection between insufficient welfare grant levels and increasing homelessness). 
164. Linda's rule-consequential argument might proceed as follows: Poverty lawyers as a 
rule ought to defend tenants vigorously and with full zeal, regardless of the particular circum-
stances, as a means of protecting tenants' rights. The rule is necessary because: (a) landlords 
are on the whole more powerful and repeat players in the court system, and the added "cost" 
of an eviction created by reliable opposition helps to dissuade or deter landlords from evicting 
tenants except in the most serious cases; (b) judges on the whole favor landlords, so reliable 
opposition levels the playing field; and (c) tenant advocates are vulnerable to opponents' argu-
ments alleging abuse of their power, both ideologically and because of funding pressures, and a 
rule which converts to a professional ethic serves as a defense to exploitation of that vulnera-
bility. 
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She wants to explore this with Christopher, but two things inter-
fere. The first is time. It's almost eight o'clock, and Christopher has 
important decisions to make soon. A thorough exploration of the struc-
tural underpinnings of poverty would take months, perhaps years. Her 
other concern is a mixture of her need to appreciate and nurture moral 
autonomy and integrity, and a fear of discouraging Christopher's moral 
commitments by seeming to wish to alter them in a way that, to Chris-
topher at least, would have some relationship to her politically liberal 
views. She worries that her efforts to expand Christopher's moral hori-
zons will communicate to him that moral activism is appreciated only 
if it serves certain ends. She wants, indeed needs, to avoid that mes-
sage. Finally, despite her own differing vision, Linda is not sure that 
Christopher is wrong about the implications of this particular case, 
given LeBlanc's needs and circumstances. She and Christopher might 
disagree about the moral implications here, but this is not the case 
where she is persuaded that her judgments are unalterably sound. 
From this eavesdropping on Christopher and Linda, we can ob-
serve some necessary implications of the Luban model, including: (1) 
the reliance within the model on the decisionmaker's moral analysis 
"skill" and (2) the politically conservative effects of the model. Each of 
these deserves further exploration. 
(i) The Talent/Skill Question 
Unlike Simon, who recommends what some might term more 
objective165 legal standards by which to assess a lawyer's special re-
sponsibilities, Luban relies upon a common morality not easily sepa-
rated from complicated political and personal conceptions about fact 
and value. In the Hunters' example, Christopher will use the Luban 
formula to resist aiding these tenants. Linda, applying the same stan-
dard, might find her role obligations justified in this case. Linda's 
thinking might be more "sophisticated" than Christopher's. She has a 
Note that these reasons, even if persuasive, are not premised upon the traditional reasons 
underlying zealous advocacy under the standard conception. They emerge from a recognition of 
power differences within the housing market and the eviction bar, and thus may be justified 
there even if not justified for lawyers generally. 
165. I use the word "objective" here to capture a sense of shared processes of analysis, un-
derstanding full well its dangers. The argument that legal merit possesses a greater shared lan-
guage and content than moral merit, while perhaps commonly believed, is controversial. For 
support of this proposition, see Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 23, at 1120-23; Pepper, 
Counseling, supra note 51, at 1579. GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 91. For the opposing view, 
see Atkinson, supra note 25. at 870-71, 889-947 (claiming that Luban's morality criterion and 
Simon's legal merit criterion are equally susceptible to individual biases and preference). 
HeinOnline -- 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 53 1995-1996
1995] PRACTICED MORAL ACTIVISM 53 
broader view of historical and political consequences than does Christo-
pher, she understands better than her student the subtleties of the activ-
ist scholarship, plus (and whether this counts is a very open question) 
she has a somewhat better working knowledge of moral philosophy. If 
the Luban model cares about that expertise, it would have to account 
for the relative lack of expertise among those who wiII be using it.166 
My sense is that a model such as Luban's must care about the 
skill of moral analysis, but at the same time it cannot care about it too 
deeply. It must care because this model's development emerges from 
sophisticated argument about the quality of moral reasoning. 167 It is 
difficult to argue that there are not better and worse moral deliberative 
efforts. The "better" efforts surely must deserve some preference within 
the model. But Luban's thesis rests a great deal of, and perhaps sole, 
discretion with ordinary lawyers. The available literature indicates that 
lawyers do not possess any special moral acumen, I 68 and that law 
school has not been very effective in developing that skiIl.169 The 
166. For a sampling of the literature on the relationship between ethical expertise and ordi-
nary moral decision making, see, e.g., MacIntyre, supra note 2; E. Haavi Morreim, Philosophy 
Lessons from the Clinical Setting: Seven Sayings that Used to Annoy Me, 7 THEORETICAL 
MED. 47 (1986); Loretta M. Kopelman, What Is Applied About "Applied" Philosophy?, 15 J. 
MED. & PHIL. 199 (1990); Larry R. Churchill & Alan W. Cross, Moralist. Technician. Sophist. 
Teacher/Learner: Reflections on the Ethicist in the Clinical Setting, 7 THEORETICAL MED. 3 
(1986); Francoise Baylis, Persons with Moral Expertise and Moral Experts: Wherein Lies the 
Difference?, in CLINICAL ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 89 (Barry Hoffmaster et al. eds., 
1989). I have begun exploring that topic in my research into the field of clinical ethics in 
medicine and law. For my preliminary thoughts about this matter see Paul R. Tremblay, The 
Role of Casuistry in Legal Ethics: A Tentative Inquiry, 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 493 (1994). 
The difference in skill level between practicing lawyers and moral philosophers may 
encourage the use of the ethics committee in law settings. On the use of ethics committees in 
medicine, see, e.g., John C. Fletcher, The Bioethics Movement and Hospital Ethics Committee, 
50 MD. L. REv. 859 (1991); JUDITH W. Ross ET AL., HANDBOOK FOR HOSPITAL ETHICS 
COMMIITEES (1986). 
167. I refer here, of course, to the rich literature developing the activist view. See also 
Luban, Radical Communitarianism, supra note 29, at 591-92 (defending Shaffer's "second moral 
order," encompassing "reflection, decision, and defense," by which one's character is supple-
mented by reasoned and reflective analysis of moral considerations). 
168. Loder, Moral Skepticism. supra note 52, at 56. 
169. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. MOONEY, PUBLIC VIRTUE: LAW AND THE SOCIAL CHAR-
ACTER OF RELIGION 67 (1986) (stating that all professionalization "tends to produce 'minds in 
a groove'" and diminished sensitivity); Jack Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inqui-
ry into the Application of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 
N.Y.V. L. REv. 514 (1978); Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching 
Legal Ethics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1991) (noting that Roger Cramton's 1978 vision of law 
schools producing unreflective, amoral, instrumental lawyers remains the norm in 1991); Sanford 
Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1577, 1601 (1993); David B. 
Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Values 
of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1981 (1993) (lamenting law schools' inability 
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concern is that increased lawyer discretion on matters of moral conflict 
poses a danger to the extent that lawyers possess inadequate moral 
sensibilities. 
There are several responses to this concern. The first is visionary. 
It posits that an increased concern among lawyers for moral consider-
ations within lawyering, encouraged by the Luban perspective, will 
transform ethics instruction in law schools.170 The standard conception 
does not contemplate sophisticated moral inquiry, given its simplified 
moral world. A Luban-inspired alternative orientation would demand 
attention to complex moral questions. That focus can be expected to 
change the conversations within law schools. This response, then, might 
accept some short-term difficulties with long-range optimism. 171 
The second response is more pragmatic. It points out that even in 
the hands of less-than-sophisticated lawyers, the activist approach is 
worth the risks. Indeed, the argument asserts, it is unlikely that there 
will even be much "down-side" risk. In most ethically-charged circum-
stances, it is likely there is little harm at stake in diverging from the 
standard conception. The worst that can be expected is conformance to 
the standard conception more frequently than might be warranted, but 
that "harm" is hardly a cost of adopting the activist view. To be more 
explicit, outside of the poverty law setting (an important qualification, 
addressed just below) most ethical conflict will consist of clients who 
wield some power causing some (arguably legal) harm to a relatively 
sympathetic or innocent third party.172 This description captures the 
to inculcate social values within Black law students). 
170. See Gordon & Simon, supra note 108, at 236-40 (condemning rules-based focus of 
legal ethics instruction at the expense of developing reflective abilities); Steven Hartwell, Pro-
moting Moral Development through Experiential Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 530-32 
(1995) (concluding after empirical study that experiential and in-role ethics training leads to a 
higher stage of moral reasoning as measured by Kohlberg instruments). 
171. As with most of the themes developed here, this point assumes that traditional 
non accountability discourages moral reflection. while activism, by overruling the accountability 
demurrer, encourages such reflection. This assumption is central within the activist literature. In 
addition to the activist works already cited see Chemerinsky. supra note 25. 
There is a risk, though (as Reed Loder points out to me). that with the Luban-inspired 
activism premised on "ordinary morality" the moral conversations may not be as rich as one 
might desire. A prevailing sense of relativism may cut off conversation among persons whose 
ideas of "ordinary morality" differ. as each feels that moral opinions are personal and not 
subject to debate. For a fuller elaboration of these concerns, see Loder, Moral Skepticism. su-
pra note 52. 
172. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 27, at 3 (describing the "most common moral 
issue that arises in law practice" as "whether the lawyer and the client should take actions that 
will work to the disadvantage of other people"). I add in the element of client "power" to 
capture the real tension the lawyer will face in thinking about resisting the client. 
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paradigmatic activist concern. Let us assume that a sophisticated moral 
activist will be able to weigh the moral concerns in an intelligent way, 
and that in some cases the result of that assessment will be refusal to 
aid the client (or perhaps even betrayal of the client's goalsI73). The 
crudel74 moral activist misses the nuances, or relies upon blunt, or 
stereotypical, or self-interested considerations. Her crude approach in-
vites opposing dangers: she may refuse to aid (or may betray) her 
client when inappropriate (Danger #1); or she may go along with her 
client when a more sophisticated approach would refuse aid (Danger 
#2). We immediately see that Danger #2 is not a risk or disadvantage 
of the activist orientation; it is just as though the crude activist were a 
traditionalist.175 There is no "harm" in choosing to be an activist as 
opposed to a traditionalist if Danger #2 is the fear. So the real risk is 
Danger #1, the risk that Linda saw with Christopher. We do not want 
crude activists inappropriately sabotaging their clients' goals. The stan-
dard conception, for its part, eliminates this risk. 
But, is Danger #1 a real danger outside of poverty law circles? I 
suggest it is not. Both economics and politics support my supposition. 
The economics argument is easy. Lawyers will not too frequently be-
tray the clients upon whom they depend for their livelihood. This same 
argument, of course, minimizes the strengths of the activist view, but it 
does not eliminate them. The crude activist will benefit from the ac-
countability thesis in cases of extreme moral conflict. Given its mes-
sage of responsibility for her actions, she will find it more difficult to 
support serious (if lawful) client wrongdoing. The political argument is 
less easily articulated, but seems plausible. The question is whether a 
crude activist will tend to err on the side of supporting, or objecting 
to, the wrongdoing of powerful clients. Because of prevailing ideology, 
cognitive dissonance, or political culture, it seems safe to predict that, 
more often than not, less reflective activists will share in prevailing 
American biases about the rights of those with privilege to exercise 
their priVilege. This argument may be controversial (although I frankly 
doubt it) and needs more support than I have space for here, but if it 
173. See Luban, Partisanship. Betrayal and Autonomy, supra note 22, at 1022-23, 1026. 
174. I borrow the "crude" versus "refined" labels from William Simon's discussion of au-
tonomy and paternalism. William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's 
Case, 50 MD. L. REv. 213, 222-26 (1991). 
175. My assumption here is that a traditionalist will support her client's goals as long as 
they are legal, and will not engage in the second-guessing or moral assessments that an activist 
would. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 37, at 57. While the traditionalist/activist dividing line 
may not always be precise, my somewhat stark contrasts here serve to highlight the differences 
between the orientations. 
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is true it minimizes considerably the risks of activism outside of the 
circumstances of less-powerful clients. 
(ii) The Question of Harm to Weaker Clients 
If I am correct that even in a world of inexpert ethical analysts 
we face few risks with adoption of the morally activist conception in 
those private practice settings where clients have some power, what 
about the rest of the profession? I wish to focus here on the poverty 
law setting, where I see that morally activist lawyering poses some 
greater risks. 176 
My initial point is simple. Morally activist lawyering generally is 
not a friendly development for instrumental poverty law practice. This 
is nothing more than a truism: moral activism is unfriendly to all in-
strumental practice, by its very definition, so naturally poverty law 
settings are no exception. But the point may be elaborated with two 
more nuanced and significant observations: moral activism in its crude 
form is especially dangerous for poverty law practice and moral activ-
ism in its refined form may begin to conflate with the standard concep-
tion in the context of poor clients. 
I first address crude activism with poor clients. Consider legal 
services practice. As noted above, there are indeed greater risks of 
harm to those clients than with powerful clients. The economic and 
political incentives that operate to minimize the risk of overreaching 
and inappropriate betrayal in the private sector do not exist, or appear 
in much more diffuse form, in subsidized practice. One might respond 
that this risk is minimized not by the usual factors, but by the very 
personal ideology of the legal services lawyers who are committed to 
poor communities and are less apt to sympathize with the opponents of 
their poor clients. There is some truth to that observation, but it is 
176. Much of the legal profession falls in between the two ends which I contrast. Data 
shows that most lawyers practice in smaller firms or as sole practitioners. See BARBARA A. 
CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REpORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFES-
SION IN lllE 1990s 25 (1994). We can expect that many of these lawyers represent clients who 
are not very powerful, but who are charged fees. While my text discussion may not deal with 
this significant segment of the profession directly (by contrasting powerful clients and legal ser-
vices clients), the arguments that I develop for "powerful" clients ought to apply whenever the 
lawyers charge a fee. The arguments developed for poverty law practice ought to apply when-
ever the lawyer's fees are not dependent on the client. The difference is the degree of depen-
dency or vulnerability of the lawyer on the client's business. While smaller firms may represent 
considerably less powerful clients than large firms, their independence from their clients is cer-
tainly no less. Smaller firms and sole practitioners share the large firms' need for a continuous 
flow of business and the maintenance of an ongoing client base. 
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tempered by several realities that serve to reinforce the element of risk. 
One is that the standard conception provides legal services lawyers a 
protective argument directed outward toward critics of their zeal, and 
the activist conception undercuts that protection. A crude activist must 
respond, explicitly or internally, to critics who challenge his use of the 
law to help dangerous, unpopular, at times not-very-likable individuals. 
His traditional response relies heavily on his "role" in the standard 
conception, nonaccountability fashion. He might rely upon that excuse, 
even if he believed that his disrespected client was more worthy and 
deserving than his critics understood, as more palatable and acceptable 
than an argument on the merits. The erosion of the "adversary system 
excuse," whatever its benefits for lawyering generally, deprives legal 
services practitioners of that trumping argument against their more 
conservative detractors.177 
The other realization in response to the argument that poor clients 
are protected by the ideology of legal services lawyers is contextual. 
There is considerable evidence that poverty law practitioners experience 
some vulnerability toward, and tend to nurture relationships with, exist-
ing authority figures within their community.178 These relationships 
can be expected to have some impact on the developed ideology of 
those lawyers. Thus, the concern about crude activism within poverty 
law settings remains considerable. 
My second point is that refined activism in the poverty law set-
ting might tend to conflate with the standard conception. I conceive of 
a refined activist as one who, perhaps like Linda, includes in her moral 
assessment the power and advantage of her clients relative to others. 
Such a lawyer takes into account the structural and political back-
ground of poverty, including elements of race, class, and gender. 179 
That activist might then defend instrumental lawyering as presumptively 
morally justified with poor clients, maybe even in a strong way, 180 
177. Consistent with the concern expressed in the text is the observation that legal services 
advocates have opposed developments within legal ethics which downplay instrumental lawyer-
ing in return for greater concern for substantive merit. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as 
Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. IN-
QUIRY 677, 708 n.184 (1989); GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 125. 
178. See, e.g., Tremblay, Community-Based Ethic, supra note 82, at 1107; JACK KA1Z, 
POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 59 (1982). 
179. For examples of those writing with reference to such contexts see Bezdek: supra note 
lOS; Gilkerson, supra note 162; Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 160. 
I do not mean to imply that a "refined activist" will be politically liberal, even if I am 
one who would lean that way. My distinction between levels of moral sophistication does not 
equate with differences along political lines. I use the example of a left-leaning activist to 
establish the resemblance between one version of that activism and the traditional conception. 
180. Compare with Luban, Mid-Course Corrections, supra note 22, at 427-28 (describing 
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even if it is less justified otherwise. This is because of the inherent 
imbalances within the structural system favoring the opponents of the 
poor. David Luban has implied agreement with that reading of his 
version of morally activist lawyering, although his arguments assume a 
state or large bureaucracy opposing poor clients. 181 One would need a 
broader exception to encompass matters such as the eviction of the 
Hunters by their not-too-powerful landlord. That exception would focus 
less on the size or power of the adversary and more on the wealth of 
the client. Analogous to criminal cases, zealous advocacy and neutral 
partisanship would then be justified for all poor client representation. 
I am not persuaded that such a broad exception can be justified, 
although a refined activist perspective can support instrumental advoca-
cy in individual cases, depending on the moral merits. 182 But that 
question aside, there is a pedagogical curiosity that accompanies this 
second observation about the resemblance between activism and 
instrumentalism in poverty law settings. That curiosity concerns teach-
ing activism within clinical programs. It appeared in the supervi-
sor/student conversation about the Hunter case. If refined activism were 
indistinguishable from the standard conception in poverty law contexts, 
and if a poverty law context is the forum for teaching activist lawyer-
ing in a law school clinic, then it will not be easy to establish a "put-
your-money-where-your-mouth-is" activism model with law students. 
Starkly (and exaggeratedly) put, it is only by betraying clients that one 
commits to activism. But betrayal is always painful. Unless it is mod-
eled within the academy, it is hard to imagine it can be indoctrinated 
for later use when much more will be on the line for the then-student, 
now-lawyer. One could begin to teach real life activism by betraying 
real clients in a clinic, like the Hunters. Refined activism, though, may 
the defeasible legitimacy of role obligations, but weakly so in civil cases because of the merely 
pragmatic value of the adversary system). 
181. See LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 65 ("matters . .. between the 
powerless individual and the private megalith" ought to be exempted from his criticisms of 
excess zeal). See also Schneyer, Hired Gun, supra note 41, at II, 20 (describing a David 
Luban speech in which Luban "advocated full-bore partisanship in any context in which one's 
adversary is 'a powerful bureaucratic institution that poses a chronic potential threat to 
individuals"'). In crafting an exception to his usual objections to instrumental lawyering, Luban, 
along with many others, follows his long-standing argument that criminal defense 
instrumentalism is more justified than that in the civil context. See LUBAN, LAWYERS & Jus-
TICE, supra note 6, at 58-63. For a recent colloquy on that question, see William H. Simon, 
The Ethics 'of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993) (challenging Luban's exemp-
tion); David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729 (1993) (reply 
to Simon); William H. Simon, Reply: Further Reflections on Libertarian Criminal Defense, 91 
MICH. L. REv. 1767 (1993) (rejoinder to Luban). 
182. One might view Linda's approach to the Hunter litigation as such an example. 
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tend to protect clients like the Hunters. A potential pedagogical mes-
sage is then lost. 183 
Thus far I have described the refined activist as more understand-
ing of the conditions of poverty than one employing a cruder view. 
She would, as a result, be more open to assist in questionable actions 
than she would deem justified with more powerful clients. There is, 
however, an alternative refined perspective, equally understanding and 
sympathetic, but less willing to be of assistance in the ways I have 
described, and less likely to defend a full zeal orientation for poor 
clients. This refined view adopts the "community-based" ethic of pro-
gressive practice I have described elsewhere. 184 That ethic suggests 
that poverty lawyers take into account the broader community of clients 
in their work. Actions which might favor a client here-and-now might 
be declined if those actions would have demonstrable unfavorable im-
pact on other poor clients, either in the present or in the future. 185 
This kind of activist would look at a case like the Hunters' and consid-
er not only the harm to LeBlanc, and the legitimate, contextual circum-
stances of the Hunters, but also the long term interests of tenants in the 
local community, which would include the clinic's credibility as an 
advocate with the courts and other influential bureaucrats and officials. 
Depending on how one reads the landscape, this alternative view 
183. I need to respond to two likely objections at this point. First objection: The Hunter 
case was admittedly ambiguous; a clearer case of "bad tenants" could serve as a vehicle for 
activism in which even a refined view would not deign to support their efforts. This is plausi-
ble, but almost all cases within my clinic are at least ambiguous in the way the Hunter case 
is. There are no black hats on our clients--even the least likable have stories. Furthermore, the 
screening that occurs at all subsidized law offices would tend to keep out the truly meritless or 
repugnant cases. See Tremblay, Community-Based Ethic, supra note 82, at I I 10-I 6. 
Second objection: The "betray vs. support" dichotomy is too simplistic. There are more 
nuanced differences between a moral activist approach and a neutral partisanship approach than 
the "in/out" choice in the text implies; even considerations of how much moral dialogue to 
engage in about issues will be very different depending upon one's orientation. See, e.g., 
SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 27, at 23-24 (criticizing certain versions of "moral dia-
logue"). This objection flows from correct premises, but is inadequate. The real nub of morally 
activist lawyering is making hard, finite choices when faced with moral tension. While one can 
learn a great deal about moral activism by the process of dialogue, if a refined view will tend 
to support the clients' goals, and if even in cases of disagreement the representation will pro-
ceed unchanged, that fact affects the message about the burdens and sacrifices triggered by the 
moral activist view. 
184. Tremblay, Community-Based Ethic, supra note 82, at 1104, 1132-33 (proposing a stan-
dard by which legal services lawyers ought to assess their actions with reference to the needs 
of the local community of poor people). 
185. [d. See also Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering. Regnant Lawyering. and Street-
Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947, 959-68 (1992) (demonstrating how present client 
interests can conflict with long term interests of poor communities). 
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might be less accommodating of the Hunters' particular strategy of full-
scale litigation in this case. A considered view might conclude that full 
zeal is indeed justified in this long-term perspective.186 It might in-
stead conclude, however, that the short-term gain to the Hunters comes 
at too great an expense to some later clients, who will benefit in the 
future from more compassionate clerks, judges, landlords, and landlord 
lawyers. 187 
b) Simon's Justice-Driven "Purposivism" 
This section considers the Simon perspective in comparison to that 
of Luban. The prior discussion of Luban's activism as applied to the 
Hunter case and Linda's and Christopher'S deliberations demonstrated 
many of the risks and implications of activism generally. The question 
remains whether those risks and implications are altered in any way if 
our hypothetical lawyer were a Simon follower instead. 
Simon's "purposivist" model offers different kinds of risks and 
different kinds of benefits. Recall that I have separated Simon's activist 
proposal into the purposivist and the justice-based versions.18s At this 
point, we can see why that separation is needed. If Christopher has 
opted to follow a Simon approach rather than a Luban approach (hav-
ing read both, let us assume, and having found the Simon arguments 
more persuasive), he would look at the Hunter case somewhat differ-
ently. Following Simon, he will look not to questions of ordinary mo-
rality, but to questions of legal merit. Employing Simon's formulations 
of purpose versus forml89 and substance versus procedure, 190 
Christopher will likely view the two most technical strategies at his dis-
posal as invalid. He could, we recall, assist his clients by litigating 
186. See supra note 164 for one possible version of this argument. 
187. This second, alternative version of refined activism is, on reflection, not necessarily 
"activist" at all. It is consistent, in fact, with a more complicated view of the traditional obli-
gation. Recall that I use "activist" to refer to lawyering that is less instrumental, less client-
focused, and more considerate of third party interests, while "traditional" refers to a strategy of 
maximizing client gain through all legal tactics regardless of the harm to other. Applying these 
definitions to the alternative view I have just outlined, we see that the community-based view 
can be very instrumental, and very client-maximizing, if "client" refers to the aggregate custom-
er base of the poverty law office. There is nothing in the community-based view which de-
mands attention to harms to landlords or to other third parties, except where doing so hurts 
poor clients. In this way the view need not be activist. It is, rather, a way of redefining the 
identity of one's client, and responding to the inevitable conflicts of interest that arise in sub-
sidized poverty law practice. See Tremblay, Community-Based Ethic, supra note 82, at 1134. 
188. See supra notes 73-97 and accompanying text. 
189. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 23, at 1102-03. 
190. !d. at 1097-98. 
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both the invalidity of the notice to quit and the defect in the security 
deposit. Both were sent to the wrong address through the landlord's 
error. Christopher might properly conclude that while each serves as a 
technical, non-frivolous defense and/or counterclaim, neither serves the 
substantive purposes of the respective legislative schemes, which are 
meant to provide actual notice to the tenants in the first case and pro-
tection of the tenants' interest in the deposit in the second.191 Without 
elaborating on this point here, I think it is apparent that Christopher 
might properly apply the purposivist argument to conclude that neither 
tactic is permissible.192 
Because the purposivist version of moral activism focuses on 
apparent legal merit as presented through clear legislative intent, its 
teaching is, I believe, more easily applied than Luban's common moral-
ity standard. When one leaves the world of aneurysms, buried bodies, 
and innocent rape victimsl93 and encounters morally ambiguous terrain 
like the Hunters' dispute, purposivism offers at least the pretense of a 
more manageable, shared set of evaluative criteria. I could be wrong, 
but my sense is that Christopher can more confidently conclude that 
substantive law does not contemplate the manipulativeness that he 
might employ in this case than he can conclude that his moral vision 
ought to interfere with the interests of these tenants.194 Purposivism 
permits him language he might use more comfortably with his clients 
and with his supervisor than the language of moral values. It also may 
be the case (and on this point I am considerably less sure) that Chris-
topher can be trusted more to read the purpose of substantive law than 
to read common morality,l95 not inasmuch as his own life experience 
191. As I have described the facts, in neither case have the tenants been hanned. They re-
ceived the notice to quit on the same day it was left with the neighbor/friend. Christopher 
does not know whether the Hunters received the security deposit receipt; while it is likely that 
they did (since it went to their friend), Christopher might easily conclude that even their non-
receipt of the notice is a hannless violation of the statute as long LeBlanc can show that the 
funds were deposited in a protected account. 
192. Simon's purposivist argument, of course, pennits (and even suggests) instrumental use 
of technical rules if doing so is necessary to achieve the most meritorious result in a case. 
Simon, Ethical Discretion. supra note 23, at 1099. While some may disagree, Christopher can 
more than plausibly argue that this case is not one where he ought to use the technical tools 
to win an otherwise just claim. While it is true that the institutional process is quite imperfect, 
here that imperfection is not likely to lead to an improper result because Christopher can con-
clude that the Hunters have no "right" to stay in the apartment without paying rent. 
193. See supra note 99-104 and accompanying text. 
194. Rob Atkinson might argue that I am indeed wrong here. See Atkinson, supra note 25, 
at 889-906. 
195. For support for this point see GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 22-24; Pepper, Counseling. 
supra note 51, at 1579. 
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is concerned, but inasmuch as we expect him to use judgments to in-
terfere with some wishes of others (here, the Hunters). 
If purposivism is more manageable and perhaps more reliable, it 
is at the same time arguably more conservative in a case like the 
Hunters'. In other settings it might be more generous to poor clients 
than a Luban approach, 196 although one cannot be overly optimistic 
about the overall intentions of legislative enactments when it comes to 
the interests of poor people.197 If one were to contrast the moral vi-
sion of legal services lawyers (using the Luban approach) with the sub-
stantive purposes of most state or federal legislation (discerned by law-
yers using a purposivist approach), the former is apt to be somewhat 
more solicitous of the interests of the poor. 198 Neither activist model, 
of course, is as solicitous of those interests as is the traditional view, 
which permits all lawful tactics regardless of moral disagreement or 
legislative purpose. 
Finally, what about the true Simon approach, which transcends 
purposivism with its eye toward ''justice''? Christopher has read Simon, 
and understands that Simon is not suggesting simple purposivism, but 
instead supports an activism allowing nullification of seemingly legiti-
mate governmental aqtions if they "were so plainly wrong and the 
values they affronted so fundamental that the lawyer should disregard 
the decisions."199 In his deliberations about his role in the Hunters' 
case, Christopher may, following Simon, opt to litigate all of the vari-
196. The distinction between the two models will tum on whether legislative enactments are 
more or less solicitous to poor people than would be notions of common morality, or the 
moral vision of the lawyers involved in any given case. One area that might favor a 
purposivist orientation would be that of civil rights and antidiscrimination, where the legislative 
protection might be greater than many non-beneficiary citizens might support. An approach that 
relies upon one's sense of community morality might disadvantage civil rights plaintiffs, while 
a purposivist approach might encourage greater compliance with the statutes notwithstanding a 
lawyer's personal moral reactions to affirmative action or antidiscrimination laws. One need not 
accept my predictions of how different topics would play out to agree that the two standards, 
ordinary morality and legal merit, can lead to different lawyering choices. 
197. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty. Democracy. and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 1277 (1993) (pointing out the dominance of moneyed interests in American politics); 
Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of 
Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160 (1994) (advocating public financ-
ing of elections to remedy strong influence of money in federal politics); Einer R. Elhauge, 
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE LJ. 31, 35-44 
(1991 ) (describing "interest group theory" of legislative action, which contends that legislators 
respond to pressures from organized interests); ELIZABETII DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE 
NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION 77-83 (1983). 
198. For a skeptical view of entrusting lawyers to make more morally informed choices 
generally, see Gutmann, supra note 148, at 1764-65. 
199. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 23, at 1115. 
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ous claims and act formalistically if in good faith he understands this 
course is best to vindicate the legal merits of this dispute. 
I suspect that for most law students, and indeed for most lawyers, 
legal services or otherwise, the nullification standard described by Si-
mon would have little impact on the tactics of the case I have de-
scribed. While it is true that following the purposes of the applicable 
rules here will lead to forcible dispossession of the Hunters from their 
apartment, it would take a very creative view of American jurispru-
dence to argue that permitting a property owner to take that step in a 
case such as this contravenes "a core value of legality.,,20o Christopher 
will not feel constrained in this case by Simon's broader view; as a 
Simon adherent, he could easily justify a purposivist perspective which 
would argue against an instrumental use of these litigation tactics. 
But Simon's broader thesis, even if not influential in Christopher'S 
case, warrants some consideration in comparison to the first two we 
encountered. Two observations about the justice approach deserve men-
tion. First, it is likely to be less reliable than either of the first two 
methods as a decision-making model. While the traditional approach 
offers predictability at the possible cost of moral corruption, the various 
activist approaches sacrifice some of that certainty for a gain in integri-
ty. The increased lawyer discretion that accompanies the activist models 
presuppose some skill among lawyers in exercising such discretion in a 
meaningful way. Luban and Simon each argue that lawyers possess 
such skill. Luban relies upon common morality available to all per-
sons/OJ and Simon on legal merit, which lawyers are assumed to be 
able to recognize by virtue of their legal expertise.202 
Simon implies that the nullification function is simply another 
form of recognizing legal merit. If Simon is indeed making this claim, 
it is not persuasive. While his necessary assumption that lawyers pos-
sess judgment about legal merit in a purposivist way is controversial 
200. /d. at 1116. Supreme Court decisions from the 19th century through recent terms have 
confirmed the centrality of private property rights in American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Chicago, 
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897) (containing Justice Harlan's statement 
that "due protection of rights of property has been regarded as a vital principle of republican 
institutions"); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). See generally JAMES W. ELY, 
JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITImONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS (1992). 
201. Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy, supra note 22, at 1023-25. 
202. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 23, at 1119-23. See also SHAFFER & COCHRAN, 
supra note 27. at 38 ("Simon's justice is a recondite commodity. It is within the province of 
experts. . .• The lawyer makes the decisions, based not on moral superiority. but on technical 
superiority."). 
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but attractive, an extension of that argument to matters of nullification, 
of recognizing in a reliable way when laws applicable to one's client 
are not to be followed, is not at all self-evident. Where the common 
morality and purposivist standards are at least intuitively based upon a 
sense of shared commitments, the broader standard of legal merit is 
difficult to separate from one's deeper political standards. Indeed, 
Simon's example of this reasoning in his Ethical Discretion article 
seems only to prove this point.203 
The second observation about Simon's broader view builds upon 
the first. If the nullification standard feels less constrained and predict-
able, it is also more attractive to poor clients. Consider: The broader 
Simon view says to a legal services lawyer, "You must not use the law 
instrumentally, but must only use it in a way that you can justify other 
than through the adversary system. You must, therefore, abide by the 
spirit of clear laws, even if you could take advantage of them, but you 
may ignore plain and unambiguous laws if you believe in good faith 
that the laws do not represent fundamental legal values of our culture." 
A good faith, activist lawyer practicing within these constraints has 
more choices than one who acts according to the purposivist standard. 
The advantage for poor clients, of course, is a similar advantage for 
wealthy clients whose lawyers have the same instructions. The risk, 
then, is that a generous view of the broad Simon perspective collapses 
into a traditional model, in that it constrains lawyer manipulation less 
than either of the first two activist models. 
3) Acting According to the Activist View 
The final consideration has to be "what happens next?" The dis-
cussion up to now has helped clarify how Christopher chooses among 
the activist approaches and whether under any chosen standard the case 
203. Simon relies upon Goldberg v. Kelly. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) and some commentary 
upon that case to argue that "welfare interests [have] sufficient weight to generate a presump-
tion against interpretation of legislative norms that would impair them." Simon, Ethical Discre-
tion, supra note 23, at 1106-07 n.55. However much one would hope he were correct, it 
seems a quite inflated claim to assert that minimum subsistence constitutes a fundamental con-
stitutional principle today. While we do not need to discourage such an optimistic reading of 
available precedent for purposes of advocacy or scholarship, Simon's goals are much more 
worrisome. Simon suggests that lawyers take actions that are contrary to client wishes and 
goals based upon such this kind of reading of prevailing jurisprudence. It is one thing to re-
fuse to collaborate with a client trying to exploit technical advantages which contravene non-
controversial legal purposes (what I have labeled Simon's "purposivism"). It is quite another to 
interfere with client goals based upon a strained and wishful reading of legal values, as I see 
Simon proposing under his broader recommendations. 
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calls for something other than ordinary lawyering. Let us assume that it 
does. At this point it does not matter under which version activism has 
been triggered. We need only recognize that Christopher has concluded 
that using the eviction procedure instrumentally is unacceptable to him. 
There is not sufficient space to explore Christopher's range of 
choices in any great detail, but I do want to consider a couple of ques-
tions regarding the lawfulness of Christopher's options. Christopher 
does not live in some future morally superior world. He practices in 
Massachusetts in 1995, with whatever limits and mandates the profes-
sional responsibility laws of that state might impose upon him. Do 
those mandates permit him to be as morally activist as he might be-
lieve he ought to be? Can he act in the way that his teachers and the 
philosophers are suggesting he act? 
There are, it seems, two ways to approach these questions, a sim-
ple way and a complicated way. The simple response offers two sug-
gestions for Christopher, neither of which causes him any risk of pro-
fessional censure. He may of course talk to his clients about his moral 
or legal concerns, and hope to come to an accommodation between 
what he perceives as their less-than-principled instructions and his mor-
al or legal limitations. As many have pointed out, we too often assume 
that our clients would be unwilling to consider the moral implications 
of their choices.204 I do not want at all to belittle the importance of 
this process, but it is not an "activist" one; it is fully permitted, per-
haps encouraged, by the traditional rules.20s I therefore need not ad-
dress it fully here. The second "simple" choice is to withdraw, if the 
moral dialogue does not accomplish a satisfactory accommodation of 
Christopher's concerns. Withdrawal is "activist." Depending on one's 
jurisdiction and the prevailing interpretation of norms, it is probably 
allowed. I call it "simple" because one can readily find out whether it 
is permitted within the jurisdiction, even though it is never easily cho-
sen by a lawyer. 
Christopher might try, though, to practice morally activist lawyer-
ing in a more subtle way. For instance he might: (1) not file the mo-
tion to dismiss based upon the faulty notice to quit, (2) not plead a 
security deposit counterclaim, or (3) not serve discovery if he thinks 
that, while not frivolous, doing so is purely instrumental and not justi-
fied under the standards he has chosen to follow. This, to me, is activ-
ism in an affirmative sense. It limits the scope of the representation 
204. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 27, at 37; Gutmann, supra note 148, at 1764. 
205. Margulies, Interests of Nonclients, supra note 25, at 223-27. 
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without withdrawing, and without informing the clients about the avail-
ability of the unchosen tactics.206 Christopher could simply diminish 
the range of available options that an ethical lawyer might consider, 
excluding those which he deems not fitting that definition. Just as 
Christopher would not include perjury as a choice he would discuss 
with his clients, as a moral activist he might leave the instrumental 
ploys off the table. 
This latter strategy is what I refer to as the complicated one, for 
reasons that should be .apparent. The complicated practice is more con-
sistent with an activist orientation, and truer to its mission than is a 
practice in which withdrawal is the only remedy available for clients 
who choose the instrumental route. It is probably not lawful, however, 
as I read existing standards, and it may well constitute malpractice.207 
206. I include the failure to counsel the clients as an element of this activist strategy, but 
of course one could commit to not using tactics and talk to the clients about the reasons for 
that commitment. I choose a more "betraying" stance for a couple of reasons. First, it tests ac-
tivism with a more stark proposal, which serves some of my exploratory needs. Second, I can 
justifY favoring my choice. If to Christopher the instrumental option is equivalent to perjury 
(sure, one is legal and the other not, but an activist could say that distinction is of no con-
cern), then discussing it only to explain why he is not using it is an odd choice. That tactic 
elevates the choice higher than Christopher might value it. I have argued in a separate context 
that a lawyer's betraying his client's confidences without first informing the client of that in-
tention is ethically unjustified. Paul R. Tremblay, "Ratting." 1 7 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 49, 85-
87 (1993). That argument seems inconsistent with my position here, which acknowledges that 
activist lawyers might withhold from clients legally available but morally unacceptable options. 
I do think there are critical differences between the active betrayals I considered in that earlier 
article, and the limitations on advocacy I describe here. My 1993 article objected to lawyers 
implying a promise of confidentiality and then revealing client information to police. I ex-
pressed concern about the resulting risk to the expectations of trust within the professional 
relationship. Id. at 87-99. By comparison, far less systemic or professional harm results if law-
yers do not offer to engage in tactics the lawyers find morally repugnant if t/Je client is not 
aware that the tactics are available. 
207. The elements of a legal malpractice claim are fourfold: duty; breach of duty; causa-
tion; and harm. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 13, at 175-76; see also Fishman v. Brooks, 487 
N.E.2d 1377 (Mass. 1986); David A. Barry, Legal Malpractice in Massachusetts, 63 MASS. L. 
REV. 15 (1978). Had Christopher opted not to raise the counterclaims or not to conduct dis-
covery, he would have breached his duty to the Hunters, if such a breach is defined as "[a] 
failure by a lawyer to exercise the care, skill or diligence that reasonably competent lawyers 
exercise under similar circumstances." HAZARD ET AL., supra note 13, at 175. While the "stan-
dard of care" question in legal services practice might be more complicated than with paying 
clients, because overworked lawyers in that setting so often cut comers (see Bellow, supra note 
134), my anecdotal sense is that it is the customary practice of legal aid lawyers faced with 
evictions in Massachusetts to file discovery requests to leverage the extra two weeks of the 
tenants' possession, and always file available counterclaims, especially since doing so is simple. 
Indeed, it is because poverty lawyers are generally quite instrumental and technical in their use 
of these devices-because of the ability of these techniques to level the playing field of the re-
spective litigants-that the standard of care is likely not to comport with Christopher's activist 
plans. 
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While one might predict that a malpractice liability judgment would be 
very unlikely in a case such as the one I have chosen to observe/o8 
an activist lawyer in the private market who costs a client substantial 
sums of money by failing to employ instrumental procedural devices 
cannot feel so confident.209 
If I am correct about this supposition, that activism is only lawful 
in the simpler but not in the more complicated fashions, that realization 
is a bit sobering for proponents of the activist position. It does not 
diminish the force of the activist message that lawyers cannot avoid 
responsibility for their actions, a message which (as it becomes more 
widespread) will consequently call for increased dialogue and more 
trepidation about instrumental, loophole lawyering. But one senses that 
the tremendous intricacy of the scholarly debate about the scope and 
the limits of various kinds of activism has presupposed that activists 
would be able to accomplish more, in actual practice alongside clients, 
than what they have always had permission, if perhaps considerably 
less incentive, to do. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article, like so much of clinical scholarship, seeks to begin 
an inquiry that deserves much more investigation. My points have been 
few. I have tried to show that the sophisticated philosophers' struggle 
to articulate models of morally activist lawyering must inform those of 
us who practice and who teach practice. At the same time, however, 
we must be modest and realistic about how much of that debate will in 
fact translate into attitudinal or behavioral changes "among ordinary 
lawyers. What we need, and this is most apt to come from clinical 
faculty within law schools, is a set of models or protocols by which 
one might try to use a morally activist approach with clients. 
Whether these tenants would have suffered "hann" by a decision by Christopher to 
forego counterclaims or discovery is a much more complex question. The chances of winning 
possession in this case was infinitesimal; while the chances of reducing the potential judgment 
was perhaps greater. for the Hunters (and many poor tenants) a large judgment is of equal 
irrelevance as a small judgment, at least in any realistic financial sense. Their real hann would 
have been in the negotiating leverage and in their loss of the chances to extend the proceed-
ings to gain valuable time. 
208. Not only are legal services clients unlikely to sue because of a lack of access to 
counsel. but in addition. if such a case were brought, one could safely predict that most judges 
or juries would be unsympathetic to the arguments of the tenants in a case where the lawyer 
opted not to act instrumentally. 
209. See Bundy & Elhauge. supra note 40, at 322 ("[I lawyers who otherwise would deny 
advice to clients on ethical grounds will not persist when threatened with malpractice liability"). 
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I have tried to experiment with variations on three protocols here. 
That experiment suggests that our protocols must anticipate how reli-
ably a lawyer might interpret the standards driving the activist stance. 
For each criterion we might use (ordinary morality, or purposivism, or 
justice), we encounter different kinds of risks and advantages. It will 
not be the philosophers, of course, who decide whether a certain action 
is morally justified, or apt to achieve legal merit, or is just in a broad-
er sense. It will be lawyers doing so. To achieve a good faith and 
workable activist model, arid one which is less subject to the persua-
sions of self-interest, one must search for such standards that these 
lawyers might comfortably recognize and accept as constraints on their 
practice. I am not sure that the philosophers have progressed very far 
in that direction yet. Finally, practicing clinical teachers must under-
stand exactly what morally activist lawyering means in terms of the 
particular behaviors current law actually permits. This consideration is 
frequently overlooked in the literature. It is among the first questions 
asked by students who want to work with these intriguing ideas, how-
ever. We owe it to them to have reasonably concrete answers. 
